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University of Iowa anti-war protests, 1970

1970-10-07 ""Iowa City People's Peace Treaty Committee"" Page 2

NIXON'S 5 POINTS
october 7, 1970

[photo]
...First, I propose that all armed forces throughout Indochina cease firing their weapons and remain in the positions they now hold. This would be a cease-fire in place. It would not in itself be an end to the conflict, but it would accomplish one goal all of us have been working toward: an end to the killing. 

I do not minimize the difficulty of maintaining a cease-fore in a guerilla war where there no front lines. But an unconventional war may require an unconventional truce: our side is ready to stand still and cease firing . . . 

This cease-fire proposal is put forth without preconditions. The general principles that should apply are these:

A cease-fire must be effectively supervised by international observers as well as by the parties themselves. Without effective supervision a cease-fire runs the constant risk of breaking down. All concerned must be confident that the cease-fire will be maintained and any local breaches of it quickly and fairly repaired. 

A cease-fore should not be the means by which either side builds up its strength by an increase in outside combat forces in any of the nations of Indochina. 

A cease-fire should cause all kinds of warfare to stop. This covers the full range of actions that have typified this war, including bombing and acts of terror. 

A cease-fire should encompass not only the fighting in Vietnam but in all of Indochina. Conflicts in this region are closely related. The United States has never sought to widen the war. What we seek is to widen the peace. 

Finally, a cease-fire should be part of a general move to end the war in Indochina. 

A cease-fire in place would undoubtedly create a host of problems in its maintenance. But it has always been easier to make war than to make a truce. To build an honorable peace, we must accept the challenge of long and difficult negotiations. 

By agreeing to stop the shooting, we can set the stage for agreements on other matters. 

The second point of the new initiative for peace is this:

I propose an Indochina peace conference. At the Paris talks today we are talking about Vietnam. But North Vietnamese troops are not only infiltrating, crossing borders and establishing bases in South Vietnam -- they are carrying on their aggression in Laos and Cambodia as well. 

An international conference is needed to deal with the conflict in all three states of Indochina. This war in Indochina has been proved to be of one piece: it cannot be cured by treating only one of its areas of outbreak. 

The essential elements of the Geneva accords of 1954 and 1962 remain valid as a basis for settlement of problems between states in the Indochina area. We shall accept the results of agreements reached between those states.

While we pursue the convening of an Indochina peace conference, we will continue negotiations in Paris. Our proposal for a larger conference can be discussed there as well as through other diplomatic channels. The Paris talks will remain our primary forum for reaching a negotiated settlement, until such time as a broader international conference produces serious negotiations. 

The third part of our peace initiative has to do with United States forces in South Vietnam.

In the past 20 months, I have reduced our troop ceilings in South Vietnam by 165,000 men. During the spring of next year these withdrawals will total more than 260,000 men -- about one-half the number in South Vietnam when I took office. 

As the American combat role and presence have decreased, so have American casualties. Their level since the completion of the Cambodian operations was the lowest for a comparable period in the last four and one-half years. 

We are ready to negotiate an agreed timetable for complete withdrawals as part of an over-all settlement. We are prepare to withdraw all our forces as part of an over-all settlement. We are prepared to withdraw all our forces as apart of a settlement based on the principles I spelled out previously and the proposals I am making tonight. 

Fourth, I ask the other side to join in a search for a political settlement that truly meets the aspirations of all South Vietnamese. 

Three principles govern our approach:
-- We seek a political solution that reflects the will of the South Vietnamese people. 
-- A fair political solution should reflect the existing relationship of political forces. 
-- We will abide by the outcome of the political processes agreed upon. 

Let there be no mistake about one essential point: the other side is not merely objecting to a few personalities. They want to dismantle the organized non-Communist forces and insure the takeover by one party, and they demand the right to exclude whomever they wish from government. 

This patently unreasonable demand is totally unacceptable. 

As my proposals today indicate, we are prepared to be flexible on many matters. But we stand firm for the right of all the South Vietnamese people to determine for themselves the kind of government they want. 

We have no intention of seeking any settlement at the conference table other than one which fairly meets the reasonable concerns of both sides. We know that when the conflict ends, the other side will still be there. The only kind of settlement that will endure is one both sides have an interest in preserving. 

Finally, I propose the immediate and unconditional release of all prisoners of war held by both sides. 

War and imprisonment should be over for all these prisoners. They and their families have already suffered too much. 

I propose that all prisoners of war, without exception and without condition, be released now to return to the place of their choice. 

I propose that all journalists and other innocent civilian victims of the conflict be released immediately as well . . . 

(PPT cont. from page 1)

THE TREATY Drafts of the treaty can be drawn up representing every segment of the population in this country. The political basis for these drafts is laid out in Mme Binh's Eight Point Program but there may be considerable variation among different groups in regard to implementation and enforcement plans deemed appropriate and possible. The logical People's Deadline is May 1, 1971, one year and one day after the US invasion of Cambodia. This period also coordinates with the probable course of events in South Viet Nam and is a clear challenge of Nixon's goals for that date. 

The Vietnamese have indicated that US delegations representing different constituencies could travel to North Vietnam to meet with their counterparts for detailed discussions of the treaty and exchange of other information. NWRO, Chicano Moratorium and NSA have already expressed an interest. NUC should take the initiative on campuses and in every community where we have contacts. 

Attempts could also be made to send such delegations to Saigon. Although students, intellectuals, clergy and others in Saigon would be prepared to join us in signing such a treaty, the stumbling block is that anti-war Americans are no longer granted visas by the Saigon regime. 

THE CAMPAIGN An aggressive six-month ratification campaign can begin with the first draft during the current electoral period. The very act of signing such a treaty, probably in violation of the Logan Act, is a break with an illegitimate government and begins to involve people in asserting their own power. By basing the document on the PRG Peace Initiative we obtain a useful instrument to educate people about the imperialist nature of the war, the political situation in Indo-China and the PRG program. 

ORGANIZING The solid local projects that can be generated are almost endless in variety and levels of commitment. During the course of the ratification campaign, every individual and community would have to confront the nature and extent of its peculiar involvement in the war and formulate plans for ending that involvement. 

DEADLINE The people's deadline of 1 May 1971 is no grandstand play, but the perfectly justifiable demand for a positive US response to the PRG Peace Initiative. If by the date the Amerikan government had failed to show its intent to withdraw all its troops by 30 June 1971, it will be necessary to demonstrate the will of the people to enforce the treaty. The six month campaign will have laid the groundwork and the plans for the kind of mass actions across the country which, added to the rapidly growing political and military pressure of the Vietnamese people, can force an end to the Amerikan war in Viet Nam.

Saving...

NIXON'S 5 POINTS october 7, 1970 [photo] ...First, I propose that all armed forces throughout Indochina cease firing their weapons and remain in the positions they now hold. This would be a cease-fire in place. It would not in itself be an end to the conflict, but it would accomplish one goal all of us have been working toward: an end to the killing. I do not minimize the difficulty of maintaining a cease-fore in a guerilla war where there no front lines. But an unconventional war may require an unconventional truce: our side is ready to stand still and cease firing . . . This cease-fire proposal is put forth without preconditions. The general principles that should apply are these: A cease-fire must be effectively supervised by international observers as well as by the parties themselves. Without effective supervision a cease-fire runs the constant risk of breaking down. All concerned must be confident that the cease-fire will be maintained and any local breaches of it quickly and fairly repaired. A cease-fore should not be the means by which either side builds up its strength by an increase in outside combat forces in any of the nations of Indochina. A cease-fire should cause all kinds of warfare to stop. This covers the full range of actions that have typified this war, including bombing and acts of terror. A cease-fire should encompass not only the fighting in Vietnam but in all of Indochina. Conflicts in this region are closely related. The United States has never sought to widen the war. What we seek is to widen the peace. Finally, a cease-fire should be part of a general move to end the war in Indochina. A cease-fire in place would undoubtedly create a host of problems in its maintenance. But it has always been easier to make war than to make a truce. To build an honorable peace, we must accept the challenge of long and difficult negotiations. By agreeing to stop the shooting, we can set the stage for agreements on other matters. The second point of the new initiative for peace is this: I propose an Indochina peace conference. At the Paris talks today we are talking about Vietnam. But North Vietnamese troops are not only infiltrating, crossing borders and establishing bases in South Vietnam -- they are carrying on their aggression in Laos and Cambodia as well. An international conference is needed to deal with the conflict in all three states of Indochina. This war in Indochina has been proved to be of one piece: it cannot be cured by treating only one of its areas of outbreak. The essential elements of the Geneva accords of 1954 and 1962 remain valid as a basis for settlement of problems between states in the Indochina area. We shall accept the results of agreements reached between those states. While we pursue the convening of an Indochina peace conference, we will continue negotiations in Paris. Our proposal for a larger conference can be discussed there as well as through other diplomatic channels. The Paris talks will remain our primary forum for reaching a negotiated settlement, until such time as a broader international conference produces serious negotiations. The third part of our peace initiative has to do with United States forces in South Vietnam. In the past 20 months, I have reduced our troop ceilings in South Vietnam by 165,000 men. During the spring of next year these withdrawals will total more than 260,000 men -- about one-half the number in South Vietnam when I took office. As the American combat role and presence have decreased, so have American casualties. Their level since the completion of the Cambodian operations was the lowest for a comparable period in the last four and one-half years. We are ready to negotiate an agreed timetable for complete withdrawals as part of an over-all settlement. We are prepare to withdraw all our forces as part of an over-all settlement. We are prepared to withdraw all our forces as apart of a settlement based on the principles I spelled out previously and the proposals I am making tonight. Fourth, I ask the other side to join in a search for a political settlement that truly meets the aspirations of all South Vietnamese. Three principles govern our approach: -- We seek a political solution that reflects the will of the South Vietnamese people. -- A fair political solution should reflect the existing relationship of political forces. -- We will abide by the outcome of the political processes agreed upon. Let there be no mistake about one essential point: the other side is not merely objecting to a few personalities. They want to dismantle the organized non-Communist forces and insure the takeover by one party, and they demand the right to exclude whomever they wish from government. This patently unreasonable demand is totally unacceptable. As my proposals today indicate, we are prepared to be flexible on many matters. But we stand firm for the right of all the South Vietnamese people to determine for themselves the kind of government they want. We have no intention of seeking any settlement at the conference table other than one which fairly meets the reasonable concerns of both sides. We know that when the conflict ends, the other side will still be there. The only kind of settlement that will endure is one both sides have an interest in preserving. Finally, I propose the immediate and unconditional release of all prisoners of war held by both sides. War and imprisonment should be over for all these prisoners. They and their families have already suffered too much. I propose that all prisoners of war, without exception and without condition, be released now to return to the place of their choice. I propose that all journalists and other innocent civilian victims of the conflict be released immediately as well . . . (PPT cont. from page 1) THE TREATY Drafts of the treaty can be drawn up representing every segment of the population in this country. The political basis for these drafts is laid out in Mme Binh's Eight Point Program but there may be considerable variation among different groups in regard to implementation and enforcement plans deemed appropriate and possible. The logical People's Deadline is May 1, 1971, one year and one day after the US invasion of Cambodia. This period also coordinates with the probable course of events in South Viet Nam and is a clear challenge of Nixon's goals for that date. The Vietnamese have indicated that US delegations representing different constituencies could travel to North Vietnam to meet with their counterparts for detailed discussions of the treaty and exchange of other information. NWRO, Chicano Moratorium and NSA have already expressed an interest. NUC should take the initiative on campuses and in every community where we have contacts. Attempts could also be made to send such delegations to Saigon. Although students, intellectuals, clergy and others in Saigon would be prepared to join us in signing such a treaty, the stumbling block is that anti-war Americans are no longer granted visas by the Saigon regime. THE CAMPAIGN An aggressive six-month ratification campaign can begin with the first draft during the current electoral period. The very act of signing such a treaty, probably in violation of the Logan Act, is a break with an illegitimate government and begins to involve people in asserting their own power. By basing the document on the PRG Peace Initiative we obtain a useful instrument to educate people about the imperialist nature of the war, the political situation in Indo-China and the PRG program. ORGANIZING The solid local projects that can be generated are almost endless in variety and levels of commitment. During the course of the ratification campaign, every individual and community would have to confront the nature and extent of its peculiar involvement in the war and formulate plans for ending that involvement. DEADLINE The people's deadline of 1 May 1971 is no grandstand play, but the perfectly justifiable demand for a positive US response to the PRG Peace Initiative. If by the date the Amerikan government had failed to show its intent to withdraw all its troops by 30 June 1971, it will be necessary to demonstrate the will of the people to enforce the treaty. The six month campaign will have laid the groundwork and the plans for the kind of mass actions across the country which, added to the rapidly growing political and military pressure of the Vietnamese people, can force an end to the Amerikan war in Viet Nam.