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University of Iowa anti-war protests, 1970

1970-10-07 ""Iowa City People's Peace Treaty Committee"" Page 4

" All the News That's Fit to Print"
IN TODAY'S ISSUE: ANNUAL BUSINESS AND FINANCIAL SURVEY OF Businessmen in Far East Hopeful

Point of View
The American's Role in Asia
BY DONALD M. KENDALL
DESPITE the security nature of the American involvement in the Far East since World War II, our traditional role in that part of Asia has been commercial.

THE NEW YORK TIMES, MONDAY, JANUARY 18,1971 
Business in Saigon Is Red Tape, Frustration - and Profit
BY NANCY MORAN 
Special in the New York Times
SAIGON, South Vietnam Doing business in Saigon say 
Saigon Plans Vast Peasant Shift
Special to The New York Times
SAIGON, South Vietnam, Jan. 
have been removed from villages during the last four years. 
South Vietnamese 
feel the vast movement. 

Colonel on Mylai Panel Declared Killing P.O.W Might Be Proper
By DOUGLAS ROBINSON 
Special to The New York Times

Army Drops Charges Against Four in Alleged Mylai Cover-Up
WASHINGTON, Jan 6 (AP) -- The Army dropped today the charges against four more officers in the alleged cover-up of the killing of South Vietnamese civilians at Mylai.

THE NEW YORK TIMES, THURSDAY, JANUARY 7, 1971 
U.S. Military Assistance for 1970 Is Put at 8 Times the Figure in Budget 

AID Confirms Its Use As CIA Cover in Laos
By William N. Curry Washington Post Staff Writer

U.S. Advisers Seen 1/21/71 On Cambodian Soil 

OL.CXX....No.41,2
U.S IS NOW FLYING COMBAT MISSIONS FOR LAOS TROOPS
Helicopter Gunships Raiding Enemy and His Supplies on Ho Chi Minh Trail 
NEW STEP-UP IN AIR WAR

Plague of Laos War Stifles All Growth 
Special to The New York Times
BANGKOK- Thailand
The main stabilizing influence

LAIRD JUSTIFIES WIDENED AIR WAR TO AID CAMBODIANS
1/21/71
He Says Nixon Doctrine and Aid Bill Provide Backing for Step-up Support
TERMS EFFORT CRUCIAL 
Secretary Asserts Only Use of Ground Troops is Barred. 

Cambodia Economy Is Hard to Find
By IVER PETERSON
Special to The New York Times
PNOMPENH, Cambodia - When the Vietnam war finally 
tiles where Cambodian-Chinese owners are still making a profit from their six pr

5/14/70 
ROGERS RULES OUT TROOPS TO DEFEND CAMBODIA REGIME
Also Bars U.S. Planes but Says Aid by Bangkok and Saigon is Encouraged

VOL.CXX... No. 41,26
1/19/71
U.S. PLANS TO USE ALL AIR WEAPONS IN CAMBODIAN WAR

The United States & Laos 
Noam Chomsky 

What lessons have America policy-makers derived from the Indochina War?  The answer to this question will, no doubt, have far-reaching consequences. In this connection, their experience in Laos is of considerable importance. The American intervention in Vietnam is generally regarded as a disaster, but the reaction to the operations in Laos is rather different. 
Two specialists in counter-insurgency explained recently that "all the dilemmas are practical and as neutral in an ethical sense as the law of physics." The problem, in short, is a technical one. The goal is to establish rule of selected groups in the society that is subject to the experiment in counter-insurgency. A number of methods are available, ranging from rural development and commodity import programs to 13-52's and crops destruction, and the task facing the policy-maker is to combine these methods in such a manner as to maximize the probability that the approved social order will be maintained. Many critics of the Vietnam intervention feel that the results in Laos are encouraging. Senator Jacob Javits has commented that " This is one war that is successful," and Senator Stuart Symington, long an advocate of air power, regards the results in Laos as a vindication of his position: the bombardment of North Vietnam, he has argued, was unfair because there were too many restrictions on the pilots, but in Laos, "we use the military without shackles" and the results are more satisfactory. These critics of the Vietnam war urge that the American successes be publicized. Symington suggests that this will help overcome the " increasing frustration of the American people with the war, especially among our youth." 2
Such reactions illustrate, first of all, the extent to which opposition to the Vietnam intervention is based on its cost and failure. Furthermore, they illustrate a continuing lack of awareness of the real situation in Laos, as this is revealed by the testimony of refugees who do not appear at Senatorial Hearings to contest the claim of Ambassador William Sullivan that only military targets are attacked, that "villages or any inhabited place [are] out of bounds to US air activities,"
4
and that "the North Vietnamese are pushing the population out ahead of the,." 3 The evidence that these claims are false is overwhelming, but scarcely known. In fact, contrary to the judgment of Senators Javits and Symington, it seems that the "American successes" in Laos are, in part at least, attributable to secrecy of the war. 
The war in Laos has been an "executive war" in a relatively pure sense. 4 News coverage has been slight. Even Chairman Fulbright of the Foreign Relations Committee states that he "had no idea that we had a full-scale war going on£ until the Senate hearings of October, 1969. Senator Symington too repeatedly expressed his surprise at the scale of the American war and at the deception of the executive branch of the government, in this regard. The hearings, released in April, 1970 with many deletions, lifted the veil of secrecy to some extent. By that time, the bombing of Laos had been underway for 6 years, at an extremely high level of intensity for two years. Much of the bombing was in Northern Laos, far removed from the "Ho Chi Minh trail" Refugees report that virtually everything -- towns, villages, farms --- had long been destroyed in vast areas of the country. Such reports have been corroborated by Western observers. 5 Many refugees say that they lived in caves and tunnels for long periods, moving deeper into the forests as the bombing extended in scope. One Pathet Lao defector reports that the town if Sam Neua was destroyed by bombing in 1965. 
Refugees as well as captured prisoners report that the bombing had little military significance in the narrow sense. This is quite understandable. PAVN and Pathet Lao soldiers remain hidden in the forests, far from visible targets. A Staff Report of the Kennedy Subcommittee (Sept. 28, 1970) concludes that the purpose of the bombardment was " to destroy the physical and social infrastructure of Pathet Lao held areas and to interdict North Vietnamese infiltration." The available evidence indicates that the first of these aims had been substantially accomplished, though not the second. Thus the executive war has succeeded in two respects: first, in destroying the physical and social infrastructure of Pathet Lao held areas, which still contain over 1/3 of the population; and second, in achieving this goal in relative secrecy, with no grand exposures or detailed reporting of the sort that has plagued the similar effort in Vietnam. 
In other respects too, the American war in Laod has been a partial success. The cost has not been high by the standards of Vietnam, The Kennedy Subcommittee Staff Report estimates that "the military was spending at peak periods, upwards of $4,680,000 a day on bombing sorties over Laos." Direct military assistance to Laos is classified, but it would appear to be on the order of $500 million since 1962, reaching over $90 million in 1969 and more in 1970. 6 CIA expenditures are of course unknown The USAID "refugee relief program" of several million dollars a year must also be counted as a direct military expenditure, since it is largely " a program to support anti-Communist guerrillas in areas which, under the Geneva Accords, were Pathet Lao controlled." 7 Nevertheless, military expenditures are nothing like those in Vietnam.
The Kennedy Subcommittee Staff Report cites three "major operational programs in Laos" in addition to the bombardment : 1) " The creation of an American-directed civil administration that parallels the structure of the Royal Lao Government"; 2) "The support and supervision of a ground war fought principally by paramilitary groups drawn from highland tribes, such as the Meo;" 3) " The conducting and supporting of massive evacuations of local villagers from Pathet Lao regions in order to deny the enemy population resources."
These programs, like the massive bombardment, have had a certain success. The Staff Report concludes that the American-directed civil administration has managed " to keep the government afloat" and "to preserve the shell, if not the substance, of a neutralist government in Vientaine" with nominal authority " at least in the strategic Mekong Valley region bordering Thailand." This serves longer range American purposes. US Administration spokesman more or less concede that one of the goals of the American effort in Laos has been to buy time for the Thai elite, which has served as the main support for American aims

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" All the News That's Fit to Print" IN TODAY'S ISSUE: ANNUAL BUSINESS AND FINANCIAL SURVEY OF Businessmen in Far East Hopeful Point of View The American's Role in Asia BY DONALD M. KENDALL DESPITE the security nature of the American involvement in the Far East since World War II, our traditional role in that part of Asia has been commercial. THE NEW YORK TIMES, MONDAY, JANUARY 18,1971 Business in Saigon Is Red Tape, Frustration - and Profit BY NANCY MORAN Special in the New York Times SAIGON, South Vietnam Doing business in Saigon say Saigon Plans Vast Peasant Shift Special to The New York Times SAIGON, South Vietnam, Jan. have been removed from villages during the last four years. South Vietnamese feel the vast movement. Colonel on Mylai Panel Declared Killing P.O.W Might Be Proper By DOUGLAS ROBINSON Special to The New York Times Army Drops Charges Against Four in Alleged Mylai Cover-Up WASHINGTON, Jan 6 (AP) -- The Army dropped today the charges against four more officers in the alleged cover-up of the killing of South Vietnamese civilians at Mylai. THE NEW YORK TIMES, THURSDAY, JANUARY 7, 1971 U.S. Military Assistance for 1970 Is Put at 8 Times the Figure in Budget AID Confirms Its Use As CIA Cover in Laos By William N. Curry Washington Post Staff Writer U.S. Advisers Seen 1/21/71 On Cambodian Soil OL.CXX....No.41,2 U.S IS NOW FLYING COMBAT MISSIONS FOR LAOS TROOPS Helicopter Gunships Raiding Enemy and His Supplies on Ho Chi Minh Trail NEW STEP-UP IN AIR WAR Plague of Laos War Stifles All Growth Special to The New York Times BANGKOK- Thailand The main stabilizing influence LAIRD JUSTIFIES WIDENED AIR WAR TO AID CAMBODIANS 1/21/71 He Says Nixon Doctrine and Aid Bill Provide Backing for Step-up Support TERMS EFFORT CRUCIAL Secretary Asserts Only Use of Ground Troops is Barred. Cambodia Economy Is Hard to Find By IVER PETERSON Special to The New York Times PNOMPENH, Cambodia - When the Vietnam war finally tiles where Cambodian-Chinese owners are still making a profit from their six pr 5/14/70 ROGERS RULES OUT TROOPS TO DEFEND CAMBODIA REGIME Also Bars U.S. Planes but Says Aid by Bangkok and Saigon is Encouraged VOL.CXX... No. 41,26 1/19/71 U.S. PLANS TO USE ALL AIR WEAPONS IN CAMBODIAN WAR The United States & Laos Noam Chomsky What lessons have America policy-makers derived from the Indochina War? The answer to this question will, no doubt, have far-reaching consequences. In this connection, their experience in Laos is of considerable importance. The American intervention in Vietnam is generally regarded as a disaster, but the reaction to the operations in Laos is rather different. Two specialists in counter-insurgency explained recently that "all the dilemmas are practical and as neutral in an ethical sense as the law of physics." The problem, in short, is a technical one. The goal is to establish rule of selected groups in the society that is subject to the experiment in counter-insurgency. A number of methods are available, ranging from rural development and commodity import programs to 13-52's and crops destruction, and the task facing the policy-maker is to combine these methods in such a manner as to maximize the probability that the approved social order will be maintained. Many critics of the Vietnam intervention feel that the results in Laos are encouraging. Senator Jacob Javits has commented that " This is one war that is successful," and Senator Stuart Symington, long an advocate of air power, regards the results in Laos as a vindication of his position: the bombardment of North Vietnam, he has argued, was unfair because there were too many restrictions on the pilots, but in Laos, "we use the military without shackles" and the results are more satisfactory. These critics of the Vietnam war urge that the American successes be publicized. Symington suggests that this will help overcome the " increasing frustration of the American people with the war, especially among our youth." 2 Such reactions illustrate, first of all, the extent to which opposition to the Vietnam intervention is based on its cost and failure. Furthermore, they illustrate a continuing lack of awareness of the real situation in Laos, as this is revealed by the testimony of refugees who do not appear at Senatorial Hearings to contest the claim of Ambassador William Sullivan that only military targets are attacked, that "villages or any inhabited place [are] out of bounds to US air activities," 4 and that "the North Vietnamese are pushing the population out ahead of the,." 3 The evidence that these claims are false is overwhelming, but scarcely known. In fact, contrary to the judgment of Senators Javits and Symington, it seems that the "American successes" in Laos are, in part at least, attributable to secrecy of the war. The war in Laos has been an "executive war" in a relatively pure sense. 4 News coverage has been slight. Even Chairman Fulbright of the Foreign Relations Committee states that he "had no idea that we had a full-scale war going on£ until the Senate hearings of October, 1969. Senator Symington too repeatedly expressed his surprise at the scale of the American war and at the deception of the executive branch of the government, in this regard. The hearings, released in April, 1970 with many deletions, lifted the veil of secrecy to some extent. By that time, the bombing of Laos had been underway for 6 years, at an extremely high level of intensity for two years. Much of the bombing was in Northern Laos, far removed from the "Ho Chi Minh trail" Refugees report that virtually everything -- towns, villages, farms --- had long been destroyed in vast areas of the country. Such reports have been corroborated by Western observers. 5 Many refugees say that they lived in caves and tunnels for long periods, moving deeper into the forests as the bombing extended in scope. One Pathet Lao defector reports that the town if Sam Neua was destroyed by bombing in 1965. Refugees as well as captured prisoners report that the bombing had little military significance in the narrow sense. This is quite understandable. PAVN and Pathet Lao soldiers remain hidden in the forests, far from visible targets. A Staff Report of the Kennedy Subcommittee (Sept. 28, 1970) concludes that the purpose of the bombardment was " to destroy the physical and social infrastructure of Pathet Lao held areas and to interdict North Vietnamese infiltration." The available evidence indicates that the first of these aims had been substantially accomplished, though not the second. Thus the executive war has succeeded in two respects: first, in destroying the physical and social infrastructure of Pathet Lao held areas, which still contain over 1/3 of the population; and second, in achieving this goal in relative secrecy, with no grand exposures or detailed reporting of the sort that has plagued the similar effort in Vietnam. In other respects too, the American war in Laod has been a partial success. The cost has not been high by the standards of Vietnam, The Kennedy Subcommittee Staff Report estimates that "the military was spending at peak periods, upwards of $4,680,000 a day on bombing sorties over Laos." Direct military assistance to Laos is classified, but it would appear to be on the order of $500 million since 1962, reaching over $90 million in 1969 and more in 1970. 6 CIA expenditures are of course unknown The USAID "refugee relief program" of several million dollars a year must also be counted as a direct military expenditure, since it is largely " a program to support anti-Communist guerrillas in areas which, under the Geneva Accords, were Pathet Lao controlled." 7 Nevertheless, military expenditures are nothing like those in Vietnam. The Kennedy Subcommittee Staff Report cites three "major operational programs in Laos" in addition to the bombardment : 1) " The creation of an American-directed civil administration that parallels the structure of the Royal Lao Government"; 2) "The support and supervision of a ground war fought principally by paramilitary groups drawn from highland tribes, such as the Meo;" 3) " The conducting and supporting of massive evacuations of local villagers from Pathet Lao regions in order to deny the enemy population resources." These programs, like the massive bombardment, have had a certain success. The Staff Report concludes that the American-directed civil administration has managed " to keep the government afloat" and "to preserve the shell, if not the substance, of a neutralist government in Vientaine" with nominal authority " at least in the strategic Mekong Valley region bordering Thailand." This serves longer range American purposes. US Administration spokesman more or less concede that one of the goals of the American effort in Laos has been to buy time for the Thai elite, which has served as the main support for American aims