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University of Iowa anti-war protests, 1970

1970-10-07 ""Iowa City People's Peace Treaty Committee"" Page 5

SIA

U.S. REPORTS JETS HIT SUPPLY TRAILS ACROSS INDOCHINA

Minding other [peop]les' buiness...
[missing] business. For over one hundred [missing] the field of Far Eastern finance
[missing]stment, and [blacked out]

Promises Thailand More Military Aid for Next Decade

[missing] ALL AND [missing] E ITS HAPPENING
[missing] GROWTH
[missing] COLLEAGUES THERE

[missing] East Hopeful
J. Steele

in Southeast Asia.8
As to the ground war, this has been only a partial success. Communist forces seem stronger than ever before, and the Meo have been virtually decimated. It appears that only about half of the Meo population, 400,000 a decade ago, have survived their service to the American-sponsored ground war. But American casualties have been light, and, consequently, there is little reaction of concern at home -- a necessary component of successful counterinsurgency. 
The third major operational program, massive evacuation of civilians has contributed to "generating" hundreds of thousands of refugees, many of whom barely subsist in miserable refugee camps in government-controlled areas. But this program has, no doubt, denied certain "population resources" to the enemy, although many men and women who are capable to bearing arms have chosen to remain with Pathet Leo.
In short, though it may be an exaggeration to say that "this is one war that is successful," nevertheless the combination of secrecy and raw power has achieved results that have eluded the American forces in Vietnam, 
The official position of the US government is that it was drawn into the war in Laos in response to North Vietnamese aggression, and the US government sources seek to demonstrate that the Pathet Lao are entirely controlled by the North Vietnamese. The supporting evidence is meager and unconvincing. 9 The bombardment of Southern Laos is of course related to the American effort in South Vietnam, but it appears that the intensive attack on Northern Laos is an effort to destroy the social base of Pathet Lao. 
Evidence concerning the Pathet Lao and its programs is scanty, and must, for the moment largely be derived from the reports of refugees. 10 In April, 1970. I interviewed refugees who had recently been brought from the Plain of Jars, and several urban intellectuals who had lived in that area 11 and obtained many detailed transcriptions of interviews with refugees from both Southern and Northern Laos. The information derived from 

[insert] " We cannot let Laos fall to the Communists even if we have to fight."
Dwight D. Eisenhower
President of the United States
Washington D.C.
December 31, 1960

[insert] " When requested by the Royal Laotian Government, we have continued to provide military assistance to regular and irregular Laotian forces in the form of equipment, training and logistics. The levels of our assistance have risen in response to the growth of North Vietnamese combat activities." 
Richard M. Nixon
President of the United States
Key Biscayne, Florida
March 6, 1970 

such sources must be treated with caution. Some informants are openly sympathetic to the Pathet Lao. Most refugees tend to give rather stereotyped responses, and are reluctant to speak openly to people whom they assume to be representatives of the American government (or, as one commented, American soldiers in civilian dress). On several occasions, discussion in a refugee camp were terminated by bystanders when sensitive issues arose. Nevertheless, the reports of personal experiences give a fairly consistent and, I believe, plausible picture of life in Pathet Lao zones. 
The programs described by the refugees were rather moderate and low-keyed. A mild land reform was carried our in the Plain of Jars, a land rich area in 1965. It was followed by efforts to encourage some cooperation among peasants, leading to mixed collective-private farming, which seems to have been widely practiced by 1967. There were significant educational reforms. A literacy campaign appears to have been quite successful, and an adult education program was undertaken that included arithmetic and other skills as well as literacy. The language of instruction in schools was changed from French to Lao. Teachers were instructed to introduce what was called " a liberated style of education" that would "teach people to love their country." A USAID worker reports that peasants regard the Pathet Lao as "traditionalists" and the emphasis on the "national culture," folk culture, and so on was stressed by many informants. Teachers report that the level of instruction was raised in language and mathematics, and that four grades were introduced for everyone, in principle. A plan to extend education to 7 years could not be implemented because of the bombardment, which emptied towns and villages by 1968-9. Mechanical teaching of reading was replaced by instruction with content, dealing primarily with agriculture and practical matters, and an emphasis on "building our own country and not working for foreign people."
Some men and women were taken to the nearby town of Phonesavan (first bombed in 1965 and completely destroyed in January, 1969) for training as teachers, civil administrators, and health workers. Opinions vary as to the efficacy of the training. American sources (see note 10) report that Lao and mountain tribesmen were brought to North Vietnam for technical and medical training. 
At the same time, peasants were urged to improve production. A wealthy peasant, rather unsympathetic to the Pathet Lao, said that they were always made to study:
" They taught us mainly agriculture. One must produce more. Build the economy. One man should do the work of 10. If you produce more, you can exchange it for clothes and money. Then we can exchange the produce with other countries" Another wealthy peasant complained that " they only respect you if you have torn clothing. And indeed, the Pathet Lao reform seems to have primarily benefited the poor, Peasants were urged to abandon the use of honorific phrases and to act, and treat each other, as equals. Women were to be treated equally, and many were trained as nurses and soldiers. Money seems to have been largely eliminated. Cadres who returned to the village after training were supported by taxation. All sources agree that Pathet Lao administration was honest, even those who complained of the taxation, study, and other changes. Refugees commonly refer to the incessant efforts of cadres to persuade, and their avoidance of force or coercion. The major complaint voiced by refugees against the Pathet Lao concerns the compulsory porterage, which became an onerous burden on the peasants after the bombing drove the soldiers to remote areas where they could not be supplied by trucks. 
Refugees generally report little contact with North Vietnamese, soldiers or civilians, or even with Pathet Lao soldiers. In 1967, outsiders were replaced in the Phonosavan area by local cadres drawn from "awakening groups" in the villages, which were responsible for local implementation of Pathet Lao programs. 
Villages had a multitude of organizations: administrative, defense, youth, women, irrigation, education, agriculture, and so on. These elected their own leaders, and chose representatives to deal with outside experts on such matters as irrigation. 
Apart from Pathet Lao textbooks, which are rather impressive, I have seen no documentary evidence concerning Pathet Lao programs. From the evidence available to me, it seems a fair judgment that the Pathet Lao are the only organized indigenous force in Laos that has any realistic or comprehensive plan for social and economic development, any program that might mobilize the mass of the peasantry to provide them with a means for participation on social and political institutions. One can only speculate as to how successful they might have been. had it not been for the relentless American attack that has, very largely, replaced the hope for progress with a prayer for survival. 
In the only real elections in Laos, in 1958, the Pathet Lao won a major electoral victory. By 1961 despite ( or perhaps because of) intensive American efforts at subversion, the political party of the Pathet Lao, the Neo-Lao Haksat " appeared to be in the position to takee over the entire country" 12 The counterinsurgency efforts and the massive bombardment have forestalled this consequence. The cost to the United States has not been great, though the cost to the people of Laos is incalculable. Furthermore, American policy makers may conclude that such "executive wars," carried out with secrecy, merecenary troops, CIA subversion, and massive bombardment from impregnable sanctuaries, constitute a successful technique of counterinsurgency of the "Nixon doctrine." If so, the potential cost to developing countries elsewhere may be immense. 

NOTES

1. George K. Tanham and Dennis J. Duncanson. "Some dilemmas of counterinsurgency," Foreign Affairs, October, 1969.

2. Hearings before the Symington Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Part 3, November, 1969, pp 790-2.

3, Hearings of the Kennedy Subcommittee on Refugees of the Senate Judiciary Committee, May 7, 1970, p. 54, 57. For many similar statements see the Hearings of the Symington Subcommittee, Parts 2 (October, 1969) and 3 (November, 1969)

4. For a detailed and persuasive development of this thesis see Fred Branfman. " Many more Laoses? Presidential War in Laos; 1964-70" In N.S. Adams and A.W. McCoy, editors, Laos: War and Revolution, Harper & Row, forthcoming. 

5. See particularly the reports of Jacques Decornoy in Le Monde, June 1968, from Sam Neua province in Northeastern Laos, Harrison Salisbury of the N.Y. Times transmitted similar second-hand reports from Hanoi in 1966-7 but they were not generally believed. Given the information now available, they appear to have been accurate.

6. Symington Subcommittee Hearings, October 1969, pp. 526,533

7. Kennedy Subcommittee Staff Report, p. 23. John Hannah, the director of USAID has conceded publicly that USAID serves as a CIA "cover" in Laos, June 7, 1970

8. See the Symington Subcommittee Hearings p. 564

9. I have reviewed what there is in my At War With Asia, Chapter 4, Pantheon , 1970

10. There are several American government reports: E.T. McKeithen, Life Under the P.L. The Role of North Vietnamese Cadres, April , 1970; P.F. Langer and J.J. Zasloff, Revolution in Laos, RAND Corporation, 1969. Though heavily biassed in interpretation, these present some data, not inconsistent with the reports of refugees. See At War With Asia for some discussion. 

11. One verbatim interview appears in Adams and McCoy, op.cit

12. US State Department Background Notes, March, 1969

[insert] " Our goal in Laos has been and continues to be to reduce American involvement and not to increase it, to bring peace in accordance with the 1962 accords and not to prolong the war."
Richard M. Nixon
President of the United States 
Key Biscayne, Florida
March 6, 1970 

5

Saving...

SIA U.S. REPORTS JETS HIT SUPPLY TRAILS ACROSS INDOCHINA Minding other [peop]les' buiness... [missing] business. For over one hundred [missing] the field of Far Eastern finance [missing]stment, and [blacked out] Promises Thailand More Military Aid for Next Decade [missing] ALL AND [missing] E ITS HAPPENING [missing] GROWTH [missing] COLLEAGUES THERE [missing] East Hopeful J. Steele in Southeast Asia.8 As to the ground war, this has been only a partial success. Communist forces seem stronger than ever before, and the Meo have been virtually decimated. It appears that only about half of the Meo population, 400,000 a decade ago, have survived their service to the American-sponsored ground war. But American casualties have been light, and, consequently, there is little reaction of concern at home -- a necessary component of successful counterinsurgency. The third major operational program, massive evacuation of civilians has contributed to "generating" hundreds of thousands of refugees, many of whom barely subsist in miserable refugee camps in government-controlled areas. But this program has, no doubt, denied certain "population resources" to the enemy, although many men and women who are capable to bearing arms have chosen to remain with Pathet Leo. In short, though it may be an exaggeration to say that "this is one war that is successful," nevertheless the combination of secrecy and raw power has achieved results that have eluded the American forces in Vietnam, The official position of the US government is that it was drawn into the war in Laos in response to North Vietnamese aggression, and the US government sources seek to demonstrate that the Pathet Lao are entirely controlled by the North Vietnamese. The supporting evidence is meager and unconvincing. 9 The bombardment of Southern Laos is of course related to the American effort in South Vietnam, but it appears that the intensive attack on Northern Laos is an effort to destroy the social base of Pathet Lao. Evidence concerning the Pathet Lao and its programs is scanty, and must, for the moment largely be derived from the reports of refugees. 10 In April, 1970. I interviewed refugees who had recently been brought from the Plain of Jars, and several urban intellectuals who had lived in that area 11 and obtained many detailed transcriptions of interviews with refugees from both Southern and Northern Laos. The information derived from [insert] " We cannot let Laos fall to the Communists even if we have to fight." Dwight D. Eisenhower President of the United States Washington D.C. December 31, 1960 [insert] " When requested by the Royal Laotian Government, we have continued to provide military assistance to regular and irregular Laotian forces in the form of equipment, training and logistics. The levels of our assistance have risen in response to the growth of North Vietnamese combat activities." Richard M. Nixon President of the United States Key Biscayne, Florida March 6, 1970 such sources must be treated with caution. Some informants are openly sympathetic to the Pathet Lao. Most refugees tend to give rather stereotyped responses, and are reluctant to speak openly to people whom they assume to be representatives of the American government (or, as one commented, American soldiers in civilian dress). On several occasions, discussion in a refugee camp were terminated by bystanders when sensitive issues arose. Nevertheless, the reports of personal experiences give a fairly consistent and, I believe, plausible picture of life in Pathet Lao zones. The programs described by the refugees were rather moderate and low-keyed. A mild land reform was carried our in the Plain of Jars, a land rich area in 1965. It was followed by efforts to encourage some cooperation among peasants, leading to mixed collective-private farming, which seems to have been widely practiced by 1967. There were significant educational reforms. A literacy campaign appears to have been quite successful, and an adult education program was undertaken that included arithmetic and other skills as well as literacy. The language of instruction in schools was changed from French to Lao. Teachers were instructed to introduce what was called " a liberated style of education" that would "teach people to love their country." A USAID worker reports that peasants regard the Pathet Lao as "traditionalists" and the emphasis on the "national culture," folk culture, and so on was stressed by many informants. Teachers report that the level of instruction was raised in language and mathematics, and that four grades were introduced for everyone, in principle. A plan to extend education to 7 years could not be implemented because of the bombardment, which emptied towns and villages by 1968-9. Mechanical teaching of reading was replaced by instruction with content, dealing primarily with agriculture and practical matters, and an emphasis on "building our own country and not working for foreign people." Some men and women were taken to the nearby town of Phonesavan (first bombed in 1965 and completely destroyed in January, 1969) for training as teachers, civil administrators, and health workers. Opinions vary as to the efficacy of the training. American sources (see note 10) report that Lao and mountain tribesmen were brought to North Vietnam for technical and medical training. At the same time, peasants were urged to improve production. A wealthy peasant, rather unsympathetic to the Pathet Lao, said that they were always made to study: " They taught us mainly agriculture. One must produce more. Build the economy. One man should do the work of 10. If you produce more, you can exchange it for clothes and money. Then we can exchange the produce with other countries" Another wealthy peasant complained that " they only respect you if you have torn clothing. And indeed, the Pathet Lao reform seems to have primarily benefited the poor, Peasants were urged to abandon the use of honorific phrases and to act, and treat each other, as equals. Women were to be treated equally, and many were trained as nurses and soldiers. Money seems to have been largely eliminated. Cadres who returned to the village after training were supported by taxation. All sources agree that Pathet Lao administration was honest, even those who complained of the taxation, study, and other changes. Refugees commonly refer to the incessant efforts of cadres to persuade, and their avoidance of force or coercion. The major complaint voiced by refugees against the Pathet Lao concerns the compulsory porterage, which became an onerous burden on the peasants after the bombing drove the soldiers to remote areas where they could not be supplied by trucks. Refugees generally report little contact with North Vietnamese, soldiers or civilians, or even with Pathet Lao soldiers. In 1967, outsiders were replaced in the Phonosavan area by local cadres drawn from "awakening groups" in the villages, which were responsible for local implementation of Pathet Lao programs. Villages had a multitude of organizations: administrative, defense, youth, women, irrigation, education, agriculture, and so on. These elected their own leaders, and chose representatives to deal with outside experts on such matters as irrigation. Apart from Pathet Lao textbooks, which are rather impressive, I have seen no documentary evidence concerning Pathet Lao programs. From the evidence available to me, it seems a fair judgment that the Pathet Lao are the only organized indigenous force in Laos that has any realistic or comprehensive plan for social and economic development, any program that might mobilize the mass of the peasantry to provide them with a means for participation on social and political institutions. One can only speculate as to how successful they might have been. had it not been for the relentless American attack that has, very largely, replaced the hope for progress with a prayer for survival. In the only real elections in Laos, in 1958, the Pathet Lao won a major electoral victory. By 1961 despite ( or perhaps because of) intensive American efforts at subversion, the political party of the Pathet Lao, the Neo-Lao Haksat " appeared to be in the position to takee over the entire country" 12 The counterinsurgency efforts and the massive bombardment have forestalled this consequence. The cost to the United States has not been great, though the cost to the people of Laos is incalculable. Furthermore, American policy makers may conclude that such "executive wars," carried out with secrecy, merecenary troops, CIA subversion, and massive bombardment from impregnable sanctuaries, constitute a successful technique of counterinsurgency of the "Nixon doctrine." If so, the potential cost to developing countries elsewhere may be immense. NOTES 1. George K. Tanham and Dennis J. Duncanson. "Some dilemmas of counterinsurgency," Foreign Affairs, October, 1969. 2. Hearings before the Symington Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Part 3, November, 1969, pp 790-2. 3, Hearings of the Kennedy Subcommittee on Refugees of the Senate Judiciary Committee, May 7, 1970, p. 54, 57. For many similar statements see the Hearings of the Symington Subcommittee, Parts 2 (October, 1969) and 3 (November, 1969) 4. For a detailed and persuasive development of this thesis see Fred Branfman. " Many more Laoses? Presidential War in Laos; 1964-70" In N.S. Adams and A.W. McCoy, editors, Laos: War and Revolution, Harper & Row, forthcoming. 5. See particularly the reports of Jacques Decornoy in Le Monde, June 1968, from Sam Neua province in Northeastern Laos, Harrison Salisbury of the N.Y. Times transmitted similar second-hand reports from Hanoi in 1966-7 but they were not generally believed. Given the information now available, they appear to have been accurate. 6. Symington Subcommittee Hearings, October 1969, pp. 526,533 7. Kennedy Subcommittee Staff Report, p. 23. John Hannah, the director of USAID has conceded publicly that USAID serves as a CIA "cover" in Laos, June 7, 1970 8. See the Symington Subcommittee Hearings p. 564 9. I have reviewed what there is in my At War With Asia, Chapter 4, Pantheon , 1970 10. There are several American government reports: E.T. McKeithen, Life Under the P.L. The Role of North Vietnamese Cadres, April , 1970; P.F. Langer and J.J. Zasloff, Revolution in Laos, RAND Corporation, 1969. Though heavily biassed in interpretation, these present some data, not inconsistent with the reports of refugees. See At War With Asia for some discussion. 11. One verbatim interview appears in Adams and McCoy, op.cit 12. US State Department Background Notes, March, 1969 [insert] " Our goal in Laos has been and continues to be to reduce American involvement and not to increase it, to bring peace in accordance with the 1962 accords and not to prolong the war." Richard M. Nixon President of the United States Key Biscayne, Florida March 6, 1970 5