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University of Iowa anti-war protests, 1970

1970-10-07 ""Iowa City People's Peace Treaty Committee"" Page 6

[photo]
Air War in Laos
fred branfman

(c) Dispatch news Service International 

( Mr. Branfman, a graduate of the University of Chicago and Harvard School of Education, has spent three and a half years in Laos teaching and researching. He is fluent in Lao and French. His chapter, " The American Executive War in Laos; 1964-1970" appears in Laos: War and Revolution, released this month by Harper & Row. The following article is based on his own observations of the American mission operations in Laos and through interviews with over 1000 refugees and Pathet Lao defectors)

Vientiane Laos -- Who makes the policy to bomb in Laos? With the United States conducting one of the largest bombing campaigns in history, involving over 200,000 bombing strikes at year at a cost of more than a billion and a half dollars, the answer has not always been clear cut. Here in Laos, the widespread bombing of villages and displacement of over 100,000 villagers in Pathet Lao zones is an accepted fact. Accounts of the bombing by thousands of refugees relocated near Mekong river towns have become common knowledge. Many such narratives collected by the United States Agency for International Development and CIA investigators are on file with the mission here. 
While American officials here readily concede in private that frequent strikes against villages occur, they differ as to who is responsible. Embassy personnel place responsibility with the Air Force, while the military insist that they have simply followed Embassy directives. Relatively little information about policy-making had been made public to date. To sort out the issues, it is necessary to understand the nature of the air effort here. For the roots of the decision to bomb civilian targets lie both in the vastness of the air war and its ineffectiveness against guerilla fighters. 
Bombing in Laos was steady but in small doses in May, 1964, until November, 1968. With the overall focus of American bombing on North and South Vietnam during this period, average daily sorties totaled no more than 200 strikes by 1968. The American Ambassador exercised direct supervision. Most strikes were against the Ho Chi Minh trail, and the number of aircraft available rarely exceeded military needs. The policy was to avoid civilian targets. When towns or villages were hit, it was usually due to a controlled and limited decision. In March, 1968, for example the Plain of Jars and Sam Neua province in Pathet Lao areas of northern Laos were heavily bombed in retaliation for the communist victory at Name Bac, two months earlier. 
Although a few villages thought to contain military hardware were targeted, most of the bombing of villages during this period came by accident or through the dumping of unexpended ordinance. When bombs could not bee dropped because of bad weather, unexpected anti-aircraft fire, or mechanical malfunction, pilots needed to dump their bombs before returning to base. They often ended up in populated regions. Dump [?] in unpopulated regions existed but were rarely used. As one airman put it, " if one [dropped?] one's load in a dump zone, one had to answer questions. The Air Force is not in the business of wasting bombs."
The friendly village of Ban Done in the far north of Laos was bombed twice in this manner in 1967. Compared to what was to follow, however, such bombing of civilian targets was relatively infrequent. November, 1968 marked a basic turning point. Planes that had been bombing North Vietnam were diverted into Laos after the bombing halt of November 1. As the war scaled down in South Vietnam, planes were brought in from there as well. 
The dimensions of the air war quickly skyrocketed. Average daily sorties soon shot up to six or seven hundred, but sometimes going as high as 1500 during peak periods. Reliable sources estimate the cost of the air war in 1969 was $1.7 billion. Well over 200,000 sorties were flown, delivering over half a million tons of ordinance. Bombing continued at the roughly the same level in 1970. The burgeoning air war involved more than 50,000 American airmen, located at bases in Thailand, South Vietnam, Guam and Okinawa, and carriers of the 7th fleet. 
The air space about Pathet Lao zones was soon filled with well over 1000 aircraft daily: light spotter planes at 2,000 feet: AIE, A26 and T28 prop bombers, AC47 and AC130 gunships, flare ships and rescue and gunship helicopters at 5,00; F4, F105, and B57 jet fighters and jet reconnaissance aircraft at 10,000; KC135 super tankers at 20,000; C130's filled with electronic gear designed to coordinate the bombing on specific sectors at 25,000; B52 bombers at 30,000 and C130's of Hillsboro Control which coordinate all the bombing in Laos, at 35,000.
Expensive electronic equipment has become a special feature of this phase of the air war. Task Force Alpha alone, designed to monitor traffic along the Ho Chi Minh trail through electronic sensors, cost an estimated $3 billion alone, above the expenditure on the bombing. 
The proliferation of aircraft inevitably led to widespread bombing of towns and villages. Available bombers soon outstripped such conventional military targets as known troop concentrations, arms depots, trucks and truck parts. As it became necessary to find new targets for the expanded air fleet, dozens of population centers were removed from the restricted target listing. Reasons for doing so are closely related to the nature of terrain in Pathet Lao zones. Three factors stand out. 
Difficulties of locating military targets in these forested and mountainous regions are formidable. Little can be seen by day except a vast canopy of jungle interrupted by villages which stand out like bald spots. Night observation is limited to that illuminated by flares and dark blobs spotted through a night reconnaissance starlight scope.
The pattern of guerilla activity also limited effectiveness. Communist guerrillas sleep by day, move by night under the cover of the jungle. They are on the move constantly, usually in small squads, and hide their ammunition deep in the forest. Arms and supplies are moved in the dark, by columns of porters threading their way through the jungle or by truck. It is not surprising that informed sources unanimously report that precise intelligence on troops or supply movement was rarely available for the effective use of air power. But even with good intelligence, effective control of enemy movement has not been possible. The list of inadequacies of air technology countering guerrilla armies is a long one: Flares to 

[insert] " We have no present plans, if [Laos] is overrun, to use combat troops. I do not want to say that we would never think about it. But there are no present plans of that kind."
William P. Rogers
Secretary of State
Washington D.C.
March 3, 1970. 

light up the ground, electronic sensors to record sound infrared photography at night to pick up heat emissions from the small trucks used on the trail : AnPQu radar designed to "see through trees." All were employed, but fell short of their designed intentions. Movement on the Ho Chi Minh trail continued unabated. 
A third decisive factor leading to the bombing of population centers has been the communist strength on the ground. By the beginning of 1969, American supported group troops were in considerable disarray. The communist victory at Nam Bac in January, 1968, had been a major political and psychological blow to the Royal Lao Government. Considerable equipment was lost plus a strategic base guarding access into the ancient capital of Luang Prabang. Defenders had simply broke and run during the final attack.
During succeeding months guerrilla forces cleared most of the remaining pockets of RLG presence northeast of the Plain of Jars The Lao army, as weak and demoralized as ever, showed little promise of effective resistance. And the stronger CIA supporter Armee Clandestine had suffered heavy losses during this period as well. Further Pathet Lao successes seemed forthcoming. The shift to bombing towns and villages, and subsequent forced refugee movements was designed to forestall this possibility. It sought to deprive the army of porters and potential recruits, destroy indigenous food stores, demoralize the civilian population, and otherwise weaken Pathet Lao fighting potential. A major goal has been to reduce the Pathet Leo population base by encouraging civilians to take refuge with the Royal Lao Government. 
Refugees from more heavily bombed areas say that planes came almost daily, often as many as ten times in one day. Those from such Pathet Lao centers as the Plain of Jars in the north and Moung Phine in the south report that their villages were leveled, and that bombing continued in and around them long after their destruction. From all accounts, it appears that most of the villages in or near Pathet Lao areas have been struck. Property damage has been considerable and tens of thousands of casualties have occurred.
The air war has grown from modest tactical air support to the Lao Army to one of the most protracted and extensive bombings of civilian targets in history. This shift came while the Air Force was exerting increased control over the air war but not as a result of that shift. The Embassy in Vientiane still maintained authority over all strikes in Laos.
Although debate was continuous within the Pentagon, State Department and CIA over the nature of the air war, by 1969 all American agencies have concurred in the decision to attempt to damage the physical and social structure of the Pathet Lao so as to deny them victory. 

who has control ?
An old Laotian proverb: " when the elephants fight, the grass gets trampled." usually applied to battles between outside powers here. It is equally apt, however , in describing the conflicts among giant American agencies over the use of air power in this tiny nation. 
This history of policy-making in the air war is generally of conflict between harder and softerlining elements within the State Department, Pentagon and CIA. Debate has raged over such questions as which villages would be bombed, whether napalm would be used, and how many aircraft would be made available for a given operation. Gradually, as control flowed to the Air Force, as the influence of the CIA gre greater, and as a new American Ambassador came to rely more and more on air power, the tougher line was taken. 
Control of the air war involves two aspects: targeting and operations. Operational control has always rested with the Air Force. As former Ambassador William H. Sullivan said in Senate hearings last May, "the Air Force does not second the command of its aircraft ... to the control of the Ambassador."
From the very beginning, the Air Force determined how many sorties would be flown, which aircraft and ordinance would be used, and when strikes would be made. 
From May, 1964, until November, 1968, however, the Ambassador retained a good deal of functional control over the all-important area of targeting. Photo reconnaissance units in Thailand, South Vietnam and Laos and the CIA would submit targets to the Ambassador for approval. The authorized list numbered over 900 by the fall of 1968. 
Each week a meeting would take place at Udorn Air Force base in Thailand, attended by representatives of the Ambassador, Air Force and CIA. Twenty to fifty targets would be selected from the overall list for the week's strikes. These would then be presented to the Ambassador



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[photo] Air War in Laos fred branfman (c) Dispatch news Service International ( Mr. Branfman, a graduate of the University of Chicago and Harvard School of Education, has spent three and a half years in Laos teaching and researching. He is fluent in Lao and French. His chapter, " The American Executive War in Laos; 1964-1970" appears in Laos: War and Revolution, released this month by Harper & Row. The following article is based on his own observations of the American mission operations in Laos and through interviews with over 1000 refugees and Pathet Lao defectors) Vientiane Laos -- Who makes the policy to bomb in Laos? With the United States conducting one of the largest bombing campaigns in history, involving over 200,000 bombing strikes at year at a cost of more than a billion and a half dollars, the answer has not always been clear cut. Here in Laos, the widespread bombing of villages and displacement of over 100,000 villagers in Pathet Lao zones is an accepted fact. Accounts of the bombing by thousands of refugees relocated near Mekong river towns have become common knowledge. Many such narratives collected by the United States Agency for International Development and CIA investigators are on file with the mission here. While American officials here readily concede in private that frequent strikes against villages occur, they differ as to who is responsible. Embassy personnel place responsibility with the Air Force, while the military insist that they have simply followed Embassy directives. Relatively little information about policy-making had been made public to date. To sort out the issues, it is necessary to understand the nature of the air effort here. For the roots of the decision to bomb civilian targets lie both in the vastness of the air war and its ineffectiveness against guerilla fighters. Bombing in Laos was steady but in small doses in May, 1964, until November, 1968. With the overall focus of American bombing on North and South Vietnam during this period, average daily sorties totaled no more than 200 strikes by 1968. The American Ambassador exercised direct supervision. Most strikes were against the Ho Chi Minh trail, and the number of aircraft available rarely exceeded military needs. The policy was to avoid civilian targets. When towns or villages were hit, it was usually due to a controlled and limited decision. In March, 1968, for example the Plain of Jars and Sam Neua province in Pathet Lao areas of northern Laos were heavily bombed in retaliation for the communist victory at Name Bac, two months earlier. Although a few villages thought to contain military hardware were targeted, most of the bombing of villages during this period came by accident or through the dumping of unexpended ordinance. When bombs could not bee dropped because of bad weather, unexpected anti-aircraft fire, or mechanical malfunction, pilots needed to dump their bombs before returning to base. They often ended up in populated regions. Dump [?] in unpopulated regions existed but were rarely used. As one airman put it, " if one [dropped?] one's load in a dump zone, one had to answer questions. The Air Force is not in the business of wasting bombs." The friendly village of Ban Done in the far north of Laos was bombed twice in this manner in 1967. Compared to what was to follow, however, such bombing of civilian targets was relatively infrequent. November, 1968 marked a basic turning point. Planes that had been bombing North Vietnam were diverted into Laos after the bombing halt of November 1. As the war scaled down in South Vietnam, planes were brought in from there as well. The dimensions of the air war quickly skyrocketed. Average daily sorties soon shot up to six or seven hundred, but sometimes going as high as 1500 during peak periods. Reliable sources estimate the cost of the air war in 1969 was $1.7 billion. Well over 200,000 sorties were flown, delivering over half a million tons of ordinance. Bombing continued at the roughly the same level in 1970. The burgeoning air war involved more than 50,000 American airmen, located at bases in Thailand, South Vietnam, Guam and Okinawa, and carriers of the 7th fleet. The air space about Pathet Lao zones was soon filled with well over 1000 aircraft daily: light spotter planes at 2,000 feet: AIE, A26 and T28 prop bombers, AC47 and AC130 gunships, flare ships and rescue and gunship helicopters at 5,00; F4, F105, and B57 jet fighters and jet reconnaissance aircraft at 10,000; KC135 super tankers at 20,000; C130's filled with electronic gear designed to coordinate the bombing on specific sectors at 25,000; B52 bombers at 30,000 and C130's of Hillsboro Control which coordinate all the bombing in Laos, at 35,000. Expensive electronic equipment has become a special feature of this phase of the air war. Task Force Alpha alone, designed to monitor traffic along the Ho Chi Minh trail through electronic sensors, cost an estimated $3 billion alone, above the expenditure on the bombing. The proliferation of aircraft inevitably led to widespread bombing of towns and villages. Available bombers soon outstripped such conventional military targets as known troop concentrations, arms depots, trucks and truck parts. As it became necessary to find new targets for the expanded air fleet, dozens of population centers were removed from the restricted target listing. Reasons for doing so are closely related to the nature of terrain in Pathet Lao zones. Three factors stand out. Difficulties of locating military targets in these forested and mountainous regions are formidable. Little can be seen by day except a vast canopy of jungle interrupted by villages which stand out like bald spots. Night observation is limited to that illuminated by flares and dark blobs spotted through a night reconnaissance starlight scope. The pattern of guerilla activity also limited effectiveness. Communist guerrillas sleep by day, move by night under the cover of the jungle. They are on the move constantly, usually in small squads, and hide their ammunition deep in the forest. Arms and supplies are moved in the dark, by columns of porters threading their way through the jungle or by truck. It is not surprising that informed sources unanimously report that precise intelligence on troops or supply movement was rarely available for the effective use of air power. But even with good intelligence, effective control of enemy movement has not been possible. The list of inadequacies of air technology countering guerrilla armies is a long one: Flares to [insert] " We have no present plans, if [Laos] is overrun, to use combat troops. I do not want to say that we would never think about it. But there are no present plans of that kind." William P. Rogers Secretary of State Washington D.C. March 3, 1970. light up the ground, electronic sensors to record sound infrared photography at night to pick up heat emissions from the small trucks used on the trail : AnPQu radar designed to "see through trees." All were employed, but fell short of their designed intentions. Movement on the Ho Chi Minh trail continued unabated. A third decisive factor leading to the bombing of population centers has been the communist strength on the ground. By the beginning of 1969, American supported group troops were in considerable disarray. The communist victory at Nam Bac in January, 1968, had been a major political and psychological blow to the Royal Lao Government. Considerable equipment was lost plus a strategic base guarding access into the ancient capital of Luang Prabang. Defenders had simply broke and run during the final attack. During succeeding months guerrilla forces cleared most of the remaining pockets of RLG presence northeast of the Plain of Jars The Lao army, as weak and demoralized as ever, showed little promise of effective resistance. And the stronger CIA supporter Armee Clandestine had suffered heavy losses during this period as well. Further Pathet Lao successes seemed forthcoming. The shift to bombing towns and villages, and subsequent forced refugee movements was designed to forestall this possibility. It sought to deprive the army of porters and potential recruits, destroy indigenous food stores, demoralize the civilian population, and otherwise weaken Pathet Lao fighting potential. A major goal has been to reduce the Pathet Leo population base by encouraging civilians to take refuge with the Royal Lao Government. Refugees from more heavily bombed areas say that planes came almost daily, often as many as ten times in one day. Those from such Pathet Lao centers as the Plain of Jars in the north and Moung Phine in the south report that their villages were leveled, and that bombing continued in and around them long after their destruction. From all accounts, it appears that most of the villages in or near Pathet Lao areas have been struck. Property damage has been considerable and tens of thousands of casualties have occurred. The air war has grown from modest tactical air support to the Lao Army to one of the most protracted and extensive bombings of civilian targets in history. This shift came while the Air Force was exerting increased control over the air war but not as a result of that shift. The Embassy in Vientiane still maintained authority over all strikes in Laos. Although debate was continuous within the Pentagon, State Department and CIA over the nature of the air war, by 1969 all American agencies have concurred in the decision to attempt to damage the physical and social structure of the Pathet Lao so as to deny them victory. who has control ? An old Laotian proverb: " when the elephants fight, the grass gets trampled." usually applied to battles between outside powers here. It is equally apt, however , in describing the conflicts among giant American agencies over the use of air power in this tiny nation. This history of policy-making in the air war is generally of conflict between harder and softerlining elements within the State Department, Pentagon and CIA. Debate has raged over such questions as which villages would be bombed, whether napalm would be used, and how many aircraft would be made available for a given operation. Gradually, as control flowed to the Air Force, as the influence of the CIA gre greater, and as a new American Ambassador came to rely more and more on air power, the tougher line was taken. Control of the air war involves two aspects: targeting and operations. Operational control has always rested with the Air Force. As former Ambassador William H. Sullivan said in Senate hearings last May, "the Air Force does not second the command of its aircraft ... to the control of the Ambassador." From the very beginning, the Air Force determined how many sorties would be flown, which aircraft and ordinance would be used, and when strikes would be made. From May, 1964, until November, 1968, however, the Ambassador retained a good deal of functional control over the all-important area of targeting. Photo reconnaissance units in Thailand, South Vietnam and Laos and the CIA would submit targets to the Ambassador for approval. The authorized list numbered over 900 by the fall of 1968. Each week a meeting would take place at Udorn Air Force base in Thailand, attended by representatives of the Ambassador, Air Force and CIA. Twenty to fifty targets would be selected from the overall list for the week's strikes. These would then be presented to the Ambassador 6