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University of Iowa anti-war protests, 1970

1970-10-07 ""Iowa City People's Peace Treaty Committee"" Page 8

PRG initiative (SEPT, 17, 1970)

CONTENT OF THE DECLARATION DELIVERED BY MINISTER NGUYEN THI BINH AT THE 84th PLENARY SESSION OF THE PARIS CONFERENCE ON VIETNAM TO MAKE CLEAR CERTAIN POINTS IN THE 10-POINT OVERALL SOLUTION ISSUED BY THE FNL OF SOUTH VIETNAM AND PRG OF REPUBLIC OF SOUTH VIETNAM

To respond to the deep desire for peace of broad sectors of the people in South Vietnam, in the United States and the world, on the instruction of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam, I would like to elaborate on a number of points in the 10-point overall solution as follows:

1. The US government must put an end to its war of aggression in Vietnam, stop the policy of "Vietnamization" of the war, totally withdraw from South Vietnam troops, military personnel, weapons, and war materials of the United States as well as troops, military personnel, weapons, and war materials of the United States as well as troops, military personnel, weapons and war materials of the other foreign countries in the US camp, without posing any condition whatsoever and liquidate all US military bases in South Vietnam. 

In case the US government declares it will withdraw from South Vietnam all its troops and those of the other foreign countries in the US camp by June 30, 1971, the People's Liberation Armed Forces will refrain from attacking the withdrawing troops of the United States and those of the other foreign countries in the US camp and parties will engage at once in discussions on:
-- the question of ensuring safety for the total withdrawal from South Vietnam of US troops and those of the  other foreign countries in the US camp. 
-- the question of releasing captured militarymen.

2. The question of Vietnamese armed forces in South Vietnam shall be resolved by the Vietnamese parties among themselves. 

3. The warlike and fascist Thieu-Ky-Khiem administration, and instrument of the US policy of aggression, are frantically opposing  peace, striving to call for the intensification and expansion of the war, and for the prolongation of the US military occupation of South Vietnam by the US to make rich with the blood of the people. 

They are serving the US imperialist aggressors who massacre their compatriots and devastate their country. They have stepped up the "pacification" campaigns to terrorize the people and hold them in the vice of their regime, set up a barbarous system of jails of the type of "tiger cage" in Condao and established a police regime of the utmost cruelty in South Vietnam. They carry out ferocious repression against those who stand for peace, independence, neutrality and democracy regardless of their social stock, political tendencies and religions, they repress even those who are not of their caln. They increase forcible pressganging and endeavour to plunder the property of thee South Vietnam people so as to serve the US policy of "Vietnamization" of the war. The restoration of genuine peace in South Vietnam necessitates the formation in Saigon of an Administration without Thieu, Ky, and Khiem, an administration which stands for peace, independence, neutrality , which improves the people's living conditions, which ensures democratic liberties such as freedom of speech, freedom of press, freedom of assembly, freedom of belief, etc., and releases those who have been jailed for political reasons, and dissolves concentration camps so that the inmates therein may return to and live in their native places. The provisional revolutionary government of the Republic of South Vietnam is prepared to enter into talks with such administration on a political settlement of the South Vietnam problem so as to put an end to the war and restore peace in Vietnam. 

4. The South Vietnam people will decide themselves the political regime of South Vietnam through really free and democratic general elections, elect a national Assembly work out a constitution of a national and democratic character and set up a government reflecting the entire people's aspirations and will for peace, independence, neutrality, democracy, and national concord. 

The general elections must be held in a really free and democratic way. The modalities of the elctionsss must guarantee genuine freedom and equality during the electoral campaigns and vote proceedings to all citizens, irrespective of their political tendencies, including those who are living abroad. No party shall usurp for itself the right to organize general elections and lay down their modalities. The general elections organized by the puppet administration of the US in Saigon at the bayonets of the US occupying troops cannot be free and democratic. 

A provisional government of broad coalition is indispensable for the organization of really free and democratic general elections and also for ensuring the right to self-determination of South Vietnam people during the transitory period between the restoration of peace and the holding of general elections. 

5. The provisional coalition government will include three components:

--persons of the provisional revolutionary government of the Republic of South Vietnam.
--persons of the Saigon administration, really standing for peace, independence, neutrality and democracy.
(PRG cont. on page 12)
(continued from page 7_ 

air war in laos
Increased North Vietnamese military units took on major military objectives held by RLG forces. Though Patht Lao troops far outnumbered North Vietnamese involved in the fighting in Laos, the greater experience and skill of the Vietnamese gave them a role significant beyond their numbers. Arms, ammunition and rations flowed in steadily to Pathet Lao forces from North Viet Nam, making up losses incurred by the bombing. 
But although the bombing could not halt the progress of communist ground forces, it did, in the words of official explanation, "make them pay a price." The air war has taken a heavy toll of the civilian infrastructure. 
According to both American and British Embassy estimates, over a million people presently inhabit Pathet Lao zones. Those who have received the heaviest bombing are the 200,000 to 250,000 people inhabiting Sam Neua and Xieng Khoung provinces in northern Laos, and the quarter of a million people residing in the four southern provinces through which runs the Ho Chi Minh trail. 
Interviews with refugees from these areas indicate that the bombing has brought considerable hardship to the civilian population, forcing them literally underground. During the course of 1968 and 1969 most of the villages were evacuated. Tied down by families and belonging, the villages remained in the forested areas near their villages, hiding in caves and bunkers by day and coming out to farm their rice at night. 
Normal activities were seriously disrupted. Markets were closed, religious festivals and weddings could no longer be held, health and educational services were curtailed. Normal commerce and trade ground to a halt.
A precise estimate of civilian casualties is not possible. The refugees that were brought out represent only a small part of the population. Many families were either killed or remained behind with the Pathet Lao.
Dozens of individuals in refugee camps, however, report the loss of one or more members of their immediate families, or have been wounded themselves from the bombing. A sample of 25 refugee cillages from the Plain of Jars indicated that the casualty rate was between 5 and 10%. This suggests that the overall number killed and wounded in more heavily bombed areas can be counted in the tens of thousands.
The refugees report that most of the wounded were struck by anti-personnel bombs. Napalm and fragmentation bombs account for a smaller but sizable portion. Deaths appear to be caused by the larger 250, 500 and 750 pound bombs. Refugees also report that most of the villages in the areas of heavy bombing have been leveled. 
Refugees explain that their principal reason for wishing to come on the government side has been to escape the bombing. Though some 50,000 to 100,000 people have come out of heavily bombed areas over the last few years, it is not clear that the Pathet Lao population based has been significantly weakened.
Exact figures are unobtainable but it appears 

[insert]"Captain Bush was in his quarters, in the compound ten miles to the rear of the expected line of contact with the enemy [in Laos], when North Vietnamese commandos attacked the compound. Captain Bush took action immediately to attempt to protect other persons in the compound, exposing himself to enemy fire, and was killed. 
"He was not engaged in combat operations... [he died as a result of] hostile action."
Gerald L. Warrem
Deputy Presidential Press Secretary
Key Biscayne, Florida
March 8, 1970

that the Pathet Lao have gained back an equal number of people through new territory have taken in recent years. Most of the refugees who have come to the government side, moreover, are the older people and the very young. The young men and women have remained with the Pathet Lao army. 
There are many Lao officials in Vientaine who argue that on the whole the Pathet Lao have gained from the refugee movement being freed of a sizeable number of non-productive citizens. There is also fear that the refugees retain loyalty to the Pathet Lao, and pose a potential threat to the Mekong river towns near which they have been placed.
The air war has yielded decidedly mixed military results as well. By standard cost/benefit analysis the results have been rather meager. Such expenses as an estimated $100,000 per truck destroyed on the Ho Chi Minh trail show a rather inefficient use of resources. After an input of well over $3 billion, 1000 downed planes and 200 captured pilots, the communist insurgency is at least strong as ever. But wars, of course, are rarely evaluated by normal standards. It is clear that without the air war, the Pathet Lao would be in an even more formidable position than they are today. Bombing advocates within the CIA, Pentagon and State Department may well have been correct in arguing that only widespread bombing of civilian targets could maintain the American position in Laos. 
An American official whose job brings him in daily contact with the air war recently sketched the course of the bombings as described in this article during a private conversation. At the end he exclaimed, " The problem is that we're on the defensive here. We have no real policy. All we can do is keep on bombing and killing. But how much longer can it last? What do we do if the Pathet Lao get very much closer? Bomb Paske, Savannakhet or Vientaine?"


8

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PRG initiative (SEPT, 17, 1970) CONTENT OF THE DECLARATION DELIVERED BY MINISTER NGUYEN THI BINH AT THE 84th PLENARY SESSION OF THE PARIS CONFERENCE ON VIETNAM TO MAKE CLEAR CERTAIN POINTS IN THE 10-POINT OVERALL SOLUTION ISSUED BY THE FNL OF SOUTH VIETNAM AND PRG OF REPUBLIC OF SOUTH VIETNAM To respond to the deep desire for peace of broad sectors of the people in South Vietnam, in the United States and the world, on the instruction of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam, I would like to elaborate on a number of points in the 10-point overall solution as follows: 1. The US government must put an end to its war of aggression in Vietnam, stop the policy of "Vietnamization" of the war, totally withdraw from South Vietnam troops, military personnel, weapons, and war materials of the United States as well as troops, military personnel, weapons, and war materials of the United States as well as troops, military personnel, weapons and war materials of the other foreign countries in the US camp, without posing any condition whatsoever and liquidate all US military bases in South Vietnam. In case the US government declares it will withdraw from South Vietnam all its troops and those of the other foreign countries in the US camp by June 30, 1971, the People's Liberation Armed Forces will refrain from attacking the withdrawing troops of the United States and those of the other foreign countries in the US camp and parties will engage at once in discussions on: -- the question of ensuring safety for the total withdrawal from South Vietnam of US troops and those of the other foreign countries in the US camp. -- the question of releasing captured militarymen. 2. The question of Vietnamese armed forces in South Vietnam shall be resolved by the Vietnamese parties among themselves. 3. The warlike and fascist Thieu-Ky-Khiem administration, and instrument of the US policy of aggression, are frantically opposing peace, striving to call for the intensification and expansion of the war, and for the prolongation of the US military occupation of South Vietnam by the US to make rich with the blood of the people. They are serving the US imperialist aggressors who massacre their compatriots and devastate their country. They have stepped up the "pacification" campaigns to terrorize the people and hold them in the vice of their regime, set up a barbarous system of jails of the type of "tiger cage" in Condao and established a police regime of the utmost cruelty in South Vietnam. They carry out ferocious repression against those who stand for peace, independence, neutrality and democracy regardless of their social stock, political tendencies and religions, they repress even those who are not of their caln. They increase forcible pressganging and endeavour to plunder the property of thee South Vietnam people so as to serve the US policy of "Vietnamization" of the war. The restoration of genuine peace in South Vietnam necessitates the formation in Saigon of an Administration without Thieu, Ky, and Khiem, an administration which stands for peace, independence, neutrality , which improves the people's living conditions, which ensures democratic liberties such as freedom of speech, freedom of press, freedom of assembly, freedom of belief, etc., and releases those who have been jailed for political reasons, and dissolves concentration camps so that the inmates therein may return to and live in their native places. The provisional revolutionary government of the Republic of South Vietnam is prepared to enter into talks with such administration on a political settlement of the South Vietnam problem so as to put an end to the war and restore peace in Vietnam. 4. The South Vietnam people will decide themselves the political regime of South Vietnam through really free and democratic general elections, elect a national Assembly work out a constitution of a national and democratic character and set up a government reflecting the entire people's aspirations and will for peace, independence, neutrality, democracy, and national concord. The general elections must be held in a really free and democratic way. The modalities of the elctionsss must guarantee genuine freedom and equality during the electoral campaigns and vote proceedings to all citizens, irrespective of their political tendencies, including those who are living abroad. No party shall usurp for itself the right to organize general elections and lay down their modalities. The general elections organized by the puppet administration of the US in Saigon at the bayonets of the US occupying troops cannot be free and democratic. A provisional government of broad coalition is indispensable for the organization of really free and democratic general elections and also for ensuring the right to self-determination of South Vietnam people during the transitory period between the restoration of peace and the holding of general elections. 5. The provisional coalition government will include three components: --persons of the provisional revolutionary government of the Republic of South Vietnam. --persons of the Saigon administration, really standing for peace, independence, neutrality and democracy. (PRG cont. on page 12) (continued from page 7_ air war in laos Increased North Vietnamese military units took on major military objectives held by RLG forces. Though Patht Lao troops far outnumbered North Vietnamese involved in the fighting in Laos, the greater experience and skill of the Vietnamese gave them a role significant beyond their numbers. Arms, ammunition and rations flowed in steadily to Pathet Lao forces from North Viet Nam, making up losses incurred by the bombing. But although the bombing could not halt the progress of communist ground forces, it did, in the words of official explanation, "make them pay a price." The air war has taken a heavy toll of the civilian infrastructure. According to both American and British Embassy estimates, over a million people presently inhabit Pathet Lao zones. Those who have received the heaviest bombing are the 200,000 to 250,000 people inhabiting Sam Neua and Xieng Khoung provinces in northern Laos, and the quarter of a million people residing in the four southern provinces through which runs the Ho Chi Minh trail. Interviews with refugees from these areas indicate that the bombing has brought considerable hardship to the civilian population, forcing them literally underground. During the course of 1968 and 1969 most of the villages were evacuated. Tied down by families and belonging, the villages remained in the forested areas near their villages, hiding in caves and bunkers by day and coming out to farm their rice at night. Normal activities were seriously disrupted. Markets were closed, religious festivals and weddings could no longer be held, health and educational services were curtailed. Normal commerce and trade ground to a halt. A precise estimate of civilian casualties is not possible. The refugees that were brought out represent only a small part of the population. Many families were either killed or remained behind with the Pathet Lao. Dozens of individuals in refugee camps, however, report the loss of one or more members of their immediate families, or have been wounded themselves from the bombing. A sample of 25 refugee cillages from the Plain of Jars indicated that the casualty rate was between 5 and 10%. This suggests that the overall number killed and wounded in more heavily bombed areas can be counted in the tens of thousands. The refugees report that most of the wounded were struck by anti-personnel bombs. Napalm and fragmentation bombs account for a smaller but sizable portion. Deaths appear to be caused by the larger 250, 500 and 750 pound bombs. Refugees also report that most of the villages in the areas of heavy bombing have been leveled. Refugees explain that their principal reason for wishing to come on the government side has been to escape the bombing. Though some 50,000 to 100,000 people have come out of heavily bombed areas over the last few years, it is not clear that the Pathet Lao population based has been significantly weakened. Exact figures are unobtainable but it appears [insert]"Captain Bush was in his quarters, in the compound ten miles to the rear of the expected line of contact with the enemy [in Laos], when North Vietnamese commandos attacked the compound. Captain Bush took action immediately to attempt to protect other persons in the compound, exposing himself to enemy fire, and was killed. "He was not engaged in combat operations... [he died as a result of] hostile action." Gerald L. Warrem Deputy Presidential Press Secretary Key Biscayne, Florida March 8, 1970 that the Pathet Lao have gained back an equal number of people through new territory have taken in recent years. Most of the refugees who have come to the government side, moreover, are the older people and the very young. The young men and women have remained with the Pathet Lao army. There are many Lao officials in Vientaine who argue that on the whole the Pathet Lao have gained from the refugee movement being freed of a sizeable number of non-productive citizens. There is also fear that the refugees retain loyalty to the Pathet Lao, and pose a potential threat to the Mekong river towns near which they have been placed. The air war has yielded decidedly mixed military results as well. By standard cost/benefit analysis the results have been rather meager. Such expenses as an estimated $100,000 per truck destroyed on the Ho Chi Minh trail show a rather inefficient use of resources. After an input of well over $3 billion, 1000 downed planes and 200 captured pilots, the communist insurgency is at least strong as ever. But wars, of course, are rarely evaluated by normal standards. It is clear that without the air war, the Pathet Lao would be in an even more formidable position than they are today. Bombing advocates within the CIA, Pentagon and State Department may well have been correct in arguing that only widespread bombing of civilian targets could maintain the American position in Laos. An American official whose job brings him in daily contact with the air war recently sketched the course of the bombings as described in this article during a private conversation. At the end he exclaimed, " The problem is that we're on the defensive here. We have no real policy. All we can do is keep on bombing and killing. But how much longer can it last? What do we do if the Pathet Lao get very much closer? Bomb Paske, Savannakhet or Vientaine?" 8