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University of Iowa anti-war protests, 1970

1970-10-07 ""Iowa City People's Peace Treaty Committee"" Page 10

Sisowath Sirik Matak seized control of the Cambodian government. Within 24 hours the new leaders had the recognition of the United States. 18 Although their actual takeover of the government was not as smooth and constitutional as it was generally made out to be, they took ample measures to keep it looking smoth and constitutional afterwards.19
What actions, substantively, did the two new leaders take to carry Cambodia beyond Sihanouk on the road toward neutrality?
Of the concrete actions which can reliably be ascribed to Lon Nol and not to Sihanouk in the days immediately preceding the coup, the first of consequence was the sacking on March 11 of the North Vietnamese and Vietcong embassies in Pnompenh. Not only did this occur at the moment when it could imperil Sihanouk's forthcoming attempts to essay persuasion with Moscow and Peking, it also preceded by two days the first step Lon Nol took to warn the Communists in Cambodia that they would have a deadline (two days) for removing themselves entirely from the country. 20
Despite the lack of diplomacy in such behavior for someone who professed a sincere commitment to preserving peace and neutrality in post-Geneva Cambodia, the North Vietnamese and Vietcong were apparently willing to discuss Lon Nol's demands and proposed talks on March 15. Nol broke the talks off scarcely before they began, however, balking at the Communist wish to discuss reparations for the destruction of their embassies before taking up the matter of troops. 
This Nol, a man with a 30,000 man army possessing no more than two-month supply of ammunition, was already setting himself up as a tough guy. By breaking off the talks with the Communists, he was in effect making his unrealistic demands on evacuation non-negotiable. In the days subsequent to the coup, however, he took many opportunities to affirm his intention of backing up the demands with force. A general would never take such a hard line unless he had an easy way of backing down or unless he had some other plan. And, indeed, Lon Nol had another plan. 
His plan, as events made evident from the day of the coup forward, was to make as much noise as possible about the Communist presence in Cambodia while initiating military actions against the Communists on a level Cambodia has not witnessed since independence. His aim was to capture the attention of the United States. Unfortunately, his own army was incapable of provoking clashes large enough to cause anyone serious concern. Fortunately, South Vietnam and elements of the United States military in Vietnam, if not in Washington, were only too willing to help him out. 
The events in the military chronicle about to follow took place fully six weeks to a month before President Nixon is reputed to have resolved that intervention in Cambodia was essential for the protection of free world lives and Vietnamization. They have been culled from news dispatches emanating out of South Vietnam for the most part. Tedious as it is, this chronicle is cited both for the perspective it adds to Lon Nol's supposed commitment to the neutrality and security of his country and for the light in which it casts the Communist "foreign invasion" announced by Ziegler on April 24.
The first stage of the military saga which was to involve the United States and South Vietnam in Cambodia weeks before April 29 commences on March 15, the day by which the communists were supposed to have met Nol's deadline for evacuation. The AP reported that Cambodian troops near Nui O and South Vietnamese commanders immediately across the border near Anphu ( considerably south of Parrot's Beak) established radio contact after South Vietnamese spotter planes had located allegedly Communist positions in the vicinity: sometime in the afternoon. Cambodian commanders called in South Vietnamese air strikes and/or artillery barrages.21 Cambodia did not make any announcement of the action, although it turned out to be the first of a ten-day " battalion-size sweep operation on their side of the border" by small contingents of Cambodians with heavy allied support. 22 The next few days showed beyond a 

[insert] "It seems to us that our best policy is to be as quiet as possible, to avoid any act which appears to violate the neutrality of Cambodia. that is why we have discouraged cross-border operations. That is why we have cautioned against skirmishes on the border. We have cautioned against the South Vietnamese on that subject. We have made it clear we think it is inadvisable to have cross-border operations now."
William P. Rogers
Secretary of State
Transcript of Report to Senate Foreign Relations Committee
April 2, 1970

doubt that this was not an isolated deviation by a few Cambodian and South Vietnamese commanders, but an operation planned and supported by the respective nations' higher commands. 
The saga of the battalion sweep resumes on March 18, the day of the coup, when an American radio is given to South Vietnamese Amphu Division District Chief Col. Truong Ding Chat to convey to a Cambodian commander on the other side of the border,.23 That evening, Col. Chat meets the Lieutenant Ean, Cambodian outpost commander, " In a mud-walled Cambodian Army outpost across the border at the northwestern tip of Amphu District on the edge of the Bassac River." At noon the next day, March 20. this time accompanied by " a French-speaking American military adviser," Chat again meets with Ean at the same border post.24 Ean asks for air support against Vietcong in the Paknam forest inside Cambodia and within two hours receives it. 25 Meanwhile, South Vietnamese troops are reported crossing the border at the same moment. 26 and American spotter planes are supplying reconnaissance while South Vietnamese howitzers shell over the border from Anphu.27
On Saturday, March 21, Col. Chat again crosses the border, this time to confer with Major Ly Khieng of the Cambodian Army and twelve other Cambodian officers. On the morning of the 22nd, Sunday, Chat meets again with the officers and urges a napalm attack on the Paknam Forest to precede a "joint ground operation" 28 All of the 50 or so Cambodian soldiers present are carrying Chinese-made , Soviet-designed AK-47 rifles.29 On Monday, March 23, air strikes are reported in Khanbinh Province, Cambodia, presumably in response to this request.30 On March 24, South Vietnamese rangers, again cross the border into Cambodia. 31
A major operation involving three armies and many officers does not spring to life full blown. The military actions so far, as well as the meetings, have only been laying the groundwork for what is to come. On Thursday, March 26, as several hundred pro-Sihanouk student marchers are shot by Government troops in Pnompenh 32 and thousands of pro-Sihanouk rubber plantation workers near Kompong Cham are staging major riots to their ultimate misfortune. 33 Chat crosses the border for the last time to talk with the Cambodian officers at 9 a.m. 
On Friday, March 27, the planning of the previous few days comes to fruition as South Vietnamese rangers, supported by " two teams of American helicopter gunships" 34 drive two miles into Kandal Province, 10 miles northeast of Amphu. 35 Air strikes by the South Vietnamese Air Force occur five or more miles inside Cambodia and American jets, merely exercising the American forces "inherent right to self-defense" conduct air strikes in the northern part of the Plain of Reeds in support of the South Vietnamese ground attack. 36 The joint American-South Vietnamese- Cambodian assault continues through the weekend and comes to an end on March 29. This was the first stage on the plan of Lon Nol and his American and South Vietnamese collaborators to restore neutrality and sovereignty in Cambodia. 
If the military chronicle suggests, coordination between the makers of the coup in Pnompenh and the American and South Vietnamese military, the disarray at the diplomatic level indicates incredibly weak if not corrupt policy administration on all fronts. 
On the evening of the coup President Thieu just happened to be entertaining. As he and his guests slipped cocktails at 7 p.m. " an aide rushed in and handed him a red folder, The President drew out a single sheet of white paper, read the brief message and then smirked broadly as he handed it to Premier Tran Thieu and his Government would deny categorically until as late as April 18 any collaboration with Lon Nol's armed forces. Combine military operations, he had said earlier on the say of the coup, would come only " after our diplomatic relations are resumed." 38 His ingenious appraisal of Lon Nol's determination to drive the Communists out: " If they had not reacted the Communists would soon have controlled them all. This is the Cambodian people#'s last hope." 39 
While Thieu rejoiced at his conveniently  arranged cocktail party, American officials struggled desperately to keep their cool. In Washington, the Defense Department would not even concede until April 9 that American officers were making protocol visits into Cambodia to "exchange pleasantries and protocol greetings." 40 Not until April 18 would Washington attempt to explain the American air spotters, air strikes, helicopter gunships, or advisers with an announcement of an agreement on "limited raids" which had been in effect for three weeks. 41
The closest thing to an open admission appeared in The New York Times on April 1, when " some members of the United States military command in Saigon said they had suspicions that the South Vietnamese were going to push the operation beyond the border last Friday" 42. The Times reporter pointed out that the officials " apparently did not pass these suspicions along to the embassy or Washington: both were caught unprepared by the initial news reports." 43 This, of course, given the April 18 admission of a three-week old agreement, was untrue. 
The military command in Saigon had had reason to be suspicious. On March 19, the day after the coup, a directive from the United States command in Saigon had gone out to American advisers in border provinces to establish communications with Cambodian commanders on the other side. 44 On the same day, Col. Tran Van Hue, Chief of Chaudoc Province (where the Amphu Division was based) had issues orders to the South Vietnamese commanders on the border to provide "all assistance short of troops" to the Cambodian Army operating in their areas. Simultaneously, Maj, Yen Than, South Vietnamese IV Corps commander, authorized his officers to provide artillery spotters t the Cambodians. 45 Clearly, both American and South Vietnamese field commanders went far beyond their orders, beginning with Amphu Division Chief Chat's visits to the Cambodian officers and extending through

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Sisowath Sirik Matak seized control of the Cambodian government. Within 24 hours the new leaders had the recognition of the United States. 18 Although their actual takeover of the government was not as smooth and constitutional as it was generally made out to be, they took ample measures to keep it looking smoth and constitutional afterwards.19 What actions, substantively, did the two new leaders take to carry Cambodia beyond Sihanouk on the road toward neutrality? Of the concrete actions which can reliably be ascribed to Lon Nol and not to Sihanouk in the days immediately preceding the coup, the first of consequence was the sacking on March 11 of the North Vietnamese and Vietcong embassies in Pnompenh. Not only did this occur at the moment when it could imperil Sihanouk's forthcoming attempts to essay persuasion with Moscow and Peking, it also preceded by two days the first step Lon Nol took to warn the Communists in Cambodia that they would have a deadline (two days) for removing themselves entirely from the country. 20 Despite the lack of diplomacy in such behavior for someone who professed a sincere commitment to preserving peace and neutrality in post-Geneva Cambodia, the North Vietnamese and Vietcong were apparently willing to discuss Lon Nol's demands and proposed talks on March 15. Nol broke the talks off scarcely before they began, however, balking at the Communist wish to discuss reparations for the destruction of their embassies before taking up the matter of troops. This Nol, a man with a 30,000 man army possessing no more than two-month supply of ammunition, was already setting himself up as a tough guy. By breaking off the talks with the Communists, he was in effect making his unrealistic demands on evacuation non-negotiable. In the days subsequent to the coup, however, he took many opportunities to affirm his intention of backing up the demands with force. A general would never take such a hard line unless he had an easy way of backing down or unless he had some other plan. And, indeed, Lon Nol had another plan. His plan, as events made evident from the day of the coup forward, was to make as much noise as possible about the Communist presence in Cambodia while initiating military actions against the Communists on a level Cambodia has not witnessed since independence. His aim was to capture the attention of the United States. Unfortunately, his own army was incapable of provoking clashes large enough to cause anyone serious concern. Fortunately, South Vietnam and elements of the United States military in Vietnam, if not in Washington, were only too willing to help him out. The events in the military chronicle about to follow took place fully six weeks to a month before President Nixon is reputed to have resolved that intervention in Cambodia was essential for the protection of free world lives and Vietnamization. They have been culled from news dispatches emanating out of South Vietnam for the most part. Tedious as it is, this chronicle is cited both for the perspective it adds to Lon Nol's supposed commitment to the neutrality and security of his country and for the light in which it casts the Communist "foreign invasion" announced by Ziegler on April 24. The first stage of the military saga which was to involve the United States and South Vietnam in Cambodia weeks before April 29 commences on March 15, the day by which the communists were supposed to have met Nol's deadline for evacuation. The AP reported that Cambodian troops near Nui O and South Vietnamese commanders immediately across the border near Anphu ( considerably south of Parrot's Beak) established radio contact after South Vietnamese spotter planes had located allegedly Communist positions in the vicinity: sometime in the afternoon. Cambodian commanders called in South Vietnamese air strikes and/or artillery barrages.21 Cambodia did not make any announcement of the action, although it turned out to be the first of a ten-day " battalion-size sweep operation on their side of the border" by small contingents of Cambodians with heavy allied support. 22 The next few days showed beyond a [insert] "It seems to us that our best policy is to be as quiet as possible, to avoid any act which appears to violate the neutrality of Cambodia. that is why we have discouraged cross-border operations. That is why we have cautioned against skirmishes on the border. We have cautioned against the South Vietnamese on that subject. We have made it clear we think it is inadvisable to have cross-border operations now." William P. Rogers Secretary of State Transcript of Report to Senate Foreign Relations Committee April 2, 1970 doubt that this was not an isolated deviation by a few Cambodian and South Vietnamese commanders, but an operation planned and supported by the respective nations' higher commands. The saga of the battalion sweep resumes on March 18, the day of the coup, when an American radio is given to South Vietnamese Amphu Division District Chief Col. Truong Ding Chat to convey to a Cambodian commander on the other side of the border,.23 That evening, Col. Chat meets the Lieutenant Ean, Cambodian outpost commander, " In a mud-walled Cambodian Army outpost across the border at the northwestern tip of Amphu District on the edge of the Bassac River." At noon the next day, March 20. this time accompanied by " a French-speaking American military adviser," Chat again meets with Ean at the same border post.24 Ean asks for air support against Vietcong in the Paknam forest inside Cambodia and within two hours receives it. 25 Meanwhile, South Vietnamese troops are reported crossing the border at the same moment. 26 and American spotter planes are supplying reconnaissance while South Vietnamese howitzers shell over the border from Anphu.27 On Saturday, March 21, Col. Chat again crosses the border, this time to confer with Major Ly Khieng of the Cambodian Army and twelve other Cambodian officers. On the morning of the 22nd, Sunday, Chat meets again with the officers and urges a napalm attack on the Paknam Forest to precede a "joint ground operation" 28 All of the 50 or so Cambodian soldiers present are carrying Chinese-made , Soviet-designed AK-47 rifles.29 On Monday, March 23, air strikes are reported in Khanbinh Province, Cambodia, presumably in response to this request.30 On March 24, South Vietnamese rangers, again cross the border into Cambodia. 31 A major operation involving three armies and many officers does not spring to life full blown. The military actions so far, as well as the meetings, have only been laying the groundwork for what is to come. On Thursday, March 26, as several hundred pro-Sihanouk student marchers are shot by Government troops in Pnompenh 32 and thousands of pro-Sihanouk rubber plantation workers near Kompong Cham are staging major riots to their ultimate misfortune. 33 Chat crosses the border for the last time to talk with the Cambodian officers at 9 a.m. On Friday, March 27, the planning of the previous few days comes to fruition as South Vietnamese rangers, supported by " two teams of American helicopter gunships" 34 drive two miles into Kandal Province, 10 miles northeast of Amphu. 35 Air strikes by the South Vietnamese Air Force occur five or more miles inside Cambodia and American jets, merely exercising the American forces "inherent right to self-defense" conduct air strikes in the northern part of the Plain of Reeds in support of the South Vietnamese ground attack. 36 The joint American-South Vietnamese- Cambodian assault continues through the weekend and comes to an end on March 29. This was the first stage on the plan of Lon Nol and his American and South Vietnamese collaborators to restore neutrality and sovereignty in Cambodia. If the military chronicle suggests, coordination between the makers of the coup in Pnompenh and the American and South Vietnamese military, the disarray at the diplomatic level indicates incredibly weak if not corrupt policy administration on all fronts. On the evening of the coup President Thieu just happened to be entertaining. As he and his guests slipped cocktails at 7 p.m. " an aide rushed in and handed him a red folder, The President drew out a single sheet of white paper, read the brief message and then smirked broadly as he handed it to Premier Tran Thieu and his Government would deny categorically until as late as April 18 any collaboration with Lon Nol's armed forces. Combine military operations, he had said earlier on the say of the coup, would come only " after our diplomatic relations are resumed." 38 His ingenious appraisal of Lon Nol's determination to drive the Communists out: " If they had not reacted the Communists would soon have controlled them all. This is the Cambodian people#'s last hope." 39 While Thieu rejoiced at his conveniently arranged cocktail party, American officials struggled desperately to keep their cool. In Washington, the Defense Department would not even concede until April 9 that American officers were making protocol visits into Cambodia to "exchange pleasantries and protocol greetings." 40 Not until April 18 would Washington attempt to explain the American air spotters, air strikes, helicopter gunships, or advisers with an announcement of an agreement on "limited raids" which had been in effect for three weeks. 41 The closest thing to an open admission appeared in The New York Times on April 1, when " some members of the United States military command in Saigon said they had suspicions that the South Vietnamese were going to push the operation beyond the border last Friday" 42. The Times reporter pointed out that the officials " apparently did not pass these suspicions along to the embassy or Washington: both were caught unprepared by the initial news reports." 43 This, of course, given the April 18 admission of a three-week old agreement, was untrue. The military command in Saigon had had reason to be suspicious. On March 19, the day after the coup, a directive from the United States command in Saigon had gone out to American advisers in border provinces to establish communications with Cambodian commanders on the other side. 44 On the same day, Col. Tran Van Hue, Chief of Chaudoc Province (where the Amphu Division was based) had issues orders to the South Vietnamese commanders on the border to provide "all assistance short of troops" to the Cambodian Army operating in their areas. Simultaneously, Maj, Yen Than, South Vietnamese IV Corps commander, authorized his officers to provide artillery spotters t the Cambodians. 45 Clearly, both American and South Vietnamese field commanders went far beyond their orders, beginning with Amphu Division Chief Chat's visits to the Cambodian officers and extending through 10