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University of Iowa anti-war protests, 1970

1970-10-07 ""Iowa City People's Peace Treaty Committee"" Page 11

the March 26 - 29 offensive.
Having successfully pulled American and South Vietnamese forces inside Cambodia, what other substantive measures did the Lon Nol Government take to consecrate Cambodia's new "active neutrality"?
Besides launching a vicious anti-Sihanouk propaganda campaign and stirring up the seeds of anti-Vietnamese feeling in his people, there is little Nol did that was not verbal. Some of his troops fought alone and unsuccessfully against alleged Communist forces near Prasaut in Svayrieng Province as early as March 21; perhaps to rationalize such an early demonstration of the Army's inability to wage war unassisted, or perhaps in an act of projection, Pnompenh complained that the Communists prevented Government advances by holding several hundred Cambodian civilians hostage. 46
Having appealed once on March 22 to Great Britain and the U.S.S.R. to recommit the ICC to Cambodia (Sihanouk had dismissed it the previous year), Pnompenh repeated this plea on March 31. Several days before doing so, the Government issued a statement of alarm, which the news services picked up and cabled out, saying that 3,000 Communists were advancing on the capital. In an article entitled, " Cambodians Welcome but Censor Foreign Newsmen" an AP reporter writing from Thailand noted that "firsthand observations that did not substantiate the government statement had been barred by the censor." 47 Also on March 31, the new Government announced that it had closed the port of Sihanoukville (Kompong Som) to ships bearing munitions for the Cambodian Communists, forgetting that Sihanouk in the previous year had stated that the shipments were cut off 48
Finally, the Lon Nol Government exercised its paradoxical pledge to "publicize every Vietnamese incursion for the attention of the whole world." To the Government, " Vietnamese" palpably did not mean the South Vietnamese Armed Forces, although it might have meant South Vietnamese Communists, North Vietnamese Communists, and ethnic Vietnamese Cambodians. 49
Nonetheless, as it was to turn out, Lon Nol had picked a wise strategy and reliable partners for executing it. If most of the world stood back in caution from the new regime at the end of March, the United States and the South Vietnamese military in South Vietnam were hurtling into the anti-Communist breach. By April 1, only decisions made at the highest level could harness the generals and prevent further escalations . That firm decisions were not made allowed the generals to carry the day. 

The Invasion Fallacy
Although many news stories after April 29 designated April 27 as the day Nixon finally decided to formalize United States involvement in Cambodia, various bits of information the press let drop by the wayside indicate that actually he made up his mind much earlier. A study in just why he did so is quite revealing. 
On April 24, five days before the first announcement of the Parrot's Beak operation, Ziegler declaimed a "foreign invasion" in Cambodia from the White House. By that day, the United States had already clumsily arranged the first known shipment of arms to Pnompenh, and the military command in South Vietnam had sent out orders to the First Cavalry Division (Air-mobile) in northeastern Tayninh Province to begin preparing the Fishhook operation.
It appears to be no coincidence that Nixon's final decision on April 27 came at the same moment that these plans for the Fishhook were completed. 50 It also appears to be no coincidence that the orders to prepare the operation on April 24 followed several hectic days of meetings in Washington and at Camp David between Nixon and members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Although civilian advisers and cabinet members from the National Security Council and Washington Special Action Group (chaired by Kissinger) also conferred frequently with Nixon at this time, those who concurred with the military in a panic prognosis won the President's ear. Both of the Administration's main military fears in proceding with intervention on April 29, the threat to Vietnamization and the imminent collapse of the Lon Nol Government, found their way to Nixon via the generals between April 20 and 24. 
On April 21, the United States high command informed Nixon the "the enemy was determined

[insert]The Vietnamese Communist offensive in Cambodia is] " a foreign invasion of a neutral country which cannot be considered in any way a pretense of a civil war."
Ronald L. Ziegler
Presidential Press Secretary
Washington, D.C. 
April 24, 1970 

in Cambodia to transform the entire border area into a largely self-sustaining base of operations for future assaults against South Vietnam" 51 And at some meeting before April 24, "at least two members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff advocated a swift and substantial delivery of weapons to assure the survival of Lon Nol regime so that it could become an ally of the United States in Asia, ad in Thailand (sic)." 52
It was action in the field which enabled the generals to persuade the President that Cambodia and Vietnamization were in peril because of a Communist escalation of the fighting and therefore it is important to see exactly how this action evolved. The story does nothing to repair the image of an overzealous military command conveyed by the events of March.
Following the termination of the first major Cambodian-allied sweep inside Cambodia in Parrot's Beak and to the south on March 29, no significant Communist counter-assaults in the area occurred for nearly a week. On Wednesday April 1, a small Cambodian border outpost was overrun five miles south of Kratie in the Fishhook, and on Sunday, April 5, six foreign newsmen were captures by Communists in three seperate incidents in the Parrot's Beak along, Highway 1. On April 5, the Cambodians and South Vietnamese took the offensive again, as "approximately two South Vietnamese battalions" began an operation against Viet Cong Sanctuaries in Cambodia across from Tayninh Province between the Fishhook and Parrot's Beak. The next several days saw a series of what appeared to be one-day actions which, like those carried out during the Chat meetings in March, forewarned a more sustained assault to follow. 
On April 7, South Vietnamese Skyraider attacks and South Vietnamese troops ferried into Cambodia in United States helicopters spearheaded a new Cambodian drive in Svayrieng Provience. 54 The Communists responded to this drive by attacking Chipou and Prasaut on Highway 1, forcing the Cambodians to fall back to Svarieng town to the west. 55 It was after this assault that correspondents saw a United States officer speeding back towards Vietnam in a jeep on April 8, and this triggered the next day's announcement in Washington of the "protocol" visits.56
On April 10, Cambodia troops apparently unassisted fought Communist soldiers at Prasaut. In the fighting, at least 89 Vietnamese civilians were killed in a "crossfire," which observers believed here as elsewhere to be a Government euphemism for massacre. 57 The Cambodians were pushed back by Sunday, April 12, however, and Svayrieng Province east of Prasaut was reported to be under complete Communist control. 58 On the same day, the Lon Nol Government rounded up 400 Vietnamese civilians for detention in Neak Luong (north of the future embattled town of Saang on the Mekong).59
It is important to note at this stage, only two weeks away from Nixon's "foreign invasion" that Pnompenh military men despite their penchant for hyperbole were noting that the Communist action in Svayrieng was "not based on military needs but intended to shake the fragile new Government." 60
Despite this, or maybe because of it, the United States and South Vietnamese armed forces forthwith stepped up the tempo of the Cambodian fighting. On April 15, fully 2,000 South Vietnamese rangers with only 100 Cambodian troops combined in an attack on Communist bases " a mile inside the Cambodian border" near Bavet in Parrot's Beak. 61 The assaults here, "like most of those carried out by the South Vietnamese troops in combat areas, were advised, supplied and supported by the American military command."62 The AP reported that two American CIA members fle into Svayrieng town to direct and coordinate military operations bu allied and Cambodian armies, 63 and CBS television correspondent Gary Sheppard filmed more South Vietnamese troops crossing the border on April 16 before he was shooed away by American military police. 64
Challanged about this second massive border incursion, a South Vietnamese spokesman said that a few rangers might have crossed the border, but "it was only a mistake by a very small unit" because "the border is hard to define." 65 The day after this mistake, on April 17, South Vietnamese troops again streamed into the Parrot's Beak. 66
With reports of this second major allied operation over the border pouring in, Washington

[insert]"To protect our men who are in Vietnam and to guarantee the continued success of our withdrawal and Vietnamization program I have concluded that the time has come for action. . . Tonight American and South Vietnamese units will attack the headquarters for the entire Communist military operation in South Vietnam..."
Richard M. Nixon
President of the United States
Washington, D.C.
April 30, 1970

could not remain inactively neutral. Ellsworth Bunker, fresh from his scoldings for not following orders to intercede on behalf of Senator Chau earlier in the year, met with Thieu for forty-five minutes on April 18. Afterwards, United States sources in Saigon reported that South Vietnam "is fully aware" of the American stand - that the borders and sovereignty of Cambodia must be respected."67 Back in Washington, "diplomatic sources" took the sting out of this Bunker- Thieu shaft of Newspeak by acknowledging the Cambodian-allied agreement of three weeks standing for "limited attacks" inside Cambodia by American-advised South Vietnamese troops.68 While this agreement was in effect, the sources added, the United States had decided publicly to express respect for Cambodia neutrality.69 Whether by plan or because of the increasing publicity in the press, some of the South Vietnamese returned from Cambodia on April 19. 70
Meanwhile, having experienced several allied Cambodian offensives in less than a month and with more on the way, the Communists inside Cambodia with whatever indigenous support was available.71 responded in mid-April with their "foreign invasion." It appeared that this was another, stronger effort by the Communists to frighten Lon Nol away from his belligerent posturing. The Communists never attempted to advance on Pnompenh, although they demonstrated very clearly that they could if they wanted to. Before Lon Nol could relent, however, his gamble on American anti-Communist fears had paid off. 
On April 16, as South Vietnamese rangers and American fire power bolstered the handful of one hundred Cambodians in Parrot's Beak. Communist forces staged a night raid on the town of Takeo south of Pnompenh on Route 3. 72 The next day, April 17, Cambodian soldiers in Takeo shot 100 Vietnamese civilians including 30 children, who had been under detention in a grade school. 73 On April 18, UPI reported 5,000 Communists encircling Takeo, while in Parrot's Beak they were beginning to regain Prasaut. 74 On April 19, probably driven westward by the South Vietnamese offensive of April 15-19, the Communists struck again southwest of Pnompenh, this time less than 20 miles away in the Highway 1 town of Saang: Cambodian troops began withdrawing without a fight. 75
In the following two days, April 20 and 21. Takeo remained practically incommunicado, and the twon of Angtassom to the west was embattled as Cambodian troops struggled unsuccessfully to hold it. Fighting continued in Parrot's Beak as thousands of South Vietnamese with American support hounded Communist supply bases. But the biggest worry was the enemy's hold on Saang and the Cambodians' inability to shake it. The Communists did not advance any closer to Pnompenh from either the east or the south, despite the convincing battlefield evidence which 
(CAMBODIA cont. on page 23)

[hand drawn cartoon]
NOW- THERE'S NO NEED FOR ALARM ... WE'RE ONLY GOING TO BE IN YOUR COUNTRY FOR A COUPLE OF MONTHS OR SO...

R.COBB

11

Saving...

the March 26 - 29 offensive. Having successfully pulled American and South Vietnamese forces inside Cambodia, what other substantive measures did the Lon Nol Government take to consecrate Cambodia's new "active neutrality"? Besides launching a vicious anti-Sihanouk propaganda campaign and stirring up the seeds of anti-Vietnamese feeling in his people, there is little Nol did that was not verbal. Some of his troops fought alone and unsuccessfully against alleged Communist forces near Prasaut in Svayrieng Province as early as March 21; perhaps to rationalize such an early demonstration of the Army's inability to wage war unassisted, or perhaps in an act of projection, Pnompenh complained that the Communists prevented Government advances by holding several hundred Cambodian civilians hostage. 46 Having appealed once on March 22 to Great Britain and the U.S.S.R. to recommit the ICC to Cambodia (Sihanouk had dismissed it the previous year), Pnompenh repeated this plea on March 31. Several days before doing so, the Government issued a statement of alarm, which the news services picked up and cabled out, saying that 3,000 Communists were advancing on the capital. In an article entitled, " Cambodians Welcome but Censor Foreign Newsmen" an AP reporter writing from Thailand noted that "firsthand observations that did not substantiate the government statement had been barred by the censor." 47 Also on March 31, the new Government announced that it had closed the port of Sihanoukville (Kompong Som) to ships bearing munitions for the Cambodian Communists, forgetting that Sihanouk in the previous year had stated that the shipments were cut off 48 Finally, the Lon Nol Government exercised its paradoxical pledge to "publicize every Vietnamese incursion for the attention of the whole world." To the Government, " Vietnamese" palpably did not mean the South Vietnamese Armed Forces, although it might have meant South Vietnamese Communists, North Vietnamese Communists, and ethnic Vietnamese Cambodians. 49 Nonetheless, as it was to turn out, Lon Nol had picked a wise strategy and reliable partners for executing it. If most of the world stood back in caution from the new regime at the end of March, the United States and the South Vietnamese military in South Vietnam were hurtling into the anti-Communist breach. By April 1, only decisions made at the highest level could harness the generals and prevent further escalations . That firm decisions were not made allowed the generals to carry the day. The Invasion Fallacy Although many news stories after April 29 designated April 27 as the day Nixon finally decided to formalize United States involvement in Cambodia, various bits of information the press let drop by the wayside indicate that actually he made up his mind much earlier. A study in just why he did so is quite revealing. On April 24, five days before the first announcement of the Parrot's Beak operation, Ziegler declaimed a "foreign invasion" in Cambodia from the White House. By that day, the United States had already clumsily arranged the first known shipment of arms to Pnompenh, and the military command in South Vietnam had sent out orders to the First Cavalry Division (Air-mobile) in northeastern Tayninh Province to begin preparing the Fishhook operation. It appears to be no coincidence that Nixon's final decision on April 27 came at the same moment that these plans for the Fishhook were completed. 50 It also appears to be no coincidence that the orders to prepare the operation on April 24 followed several hectic days of meetings in Washington and at Camp David between Nixon and members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Although civilian advisers and cabinet members from the National Security Council and Washington Special Action Group (chaired by Kissinger) also conferred frequently with Nixon at this time, those who concurred with the military in a panic prognosis won the President's ear. Both of the Administration's main military fears in proceding with intervention on April 29, the threat to Vietnamization and the imminent collapse of the Lon Nol Government, found their way to Nixon via the generals between April 20 and 24. On April 21, the United States high command informed Nixon the "the enemy was determined [insert]The Vietnamese Communist offensive in Cambodia is] " a foreign invasion of a neutral country which cannot be considered in any way a pretense of a civil war." Ronald L. Ziegler Presidential Press Secretary Washington, D.C. April 24, 1970 in Cambodia to transform the entire border area into a largely self-sustaining base of operations for future assaults against South Vietnam" 51 And at some meeting before April 24, "at least two members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff advocated a swift and substantial delivery of weapons to assure the survival of Lon Nol regime so that it could become an ally of the United States in Asia, ad in Thailand (sic)." 52 It was action in the field which enabled the generals to persuade the President that Cambodia and Vietnamization were in peril because of a Communist escalation of the fighting and therefore it is important to see exactly how this action evolved. The story does nothing to repair the image of an overzealous military command conveyed by the events of March. Following the termination of the first major Cambodian-allied sweep inside Cambodia in Parrot's Beak and to the south on March 29, no significant Communist counter-assaults in the area occurred for nearly a week. On Wednesday April 1, a small Cambodian border outpost was overrun five miles south of Kratie in the Fishhook, and on Sunday, April 5, six foreign newsmen were captures by Communists in three seperate incidents in the Parrot's Beak along, Highway 1. On April 5, the Cambodians and South Vietnamese took the offensive again, as "approximately two South Vietnamese battalions" began an operation against Viet Cong Sanctuaries in Cambodia across from Tayninh Province between the Fishhook and Parrot's Beak. The next several days saw a series of what appeared to be one-day actions which, like those carried out during the Chat meetings in March, forewarned a more sustained assault to follow. On April 7, South Vietnamese Skyraider attacks and South Vietnamese troops ferried into Cambodia in United States helicopters spearheaded a new Cambodian drive in Svayrieng Provience. 54 The Communists responded to this drive by attacking Chipou and Prasaut on Highway 1, forcing the Cambodians to fall back to Svarieng town to the west. 55 It was after this assault that correspondents saw a United States officer speeding back towards Vietnam in a jeep on April 8, and this triggered the next day's announcement in Washington of the "protocol" visits.56 On April 10, Cambodia troops apparently unassisted fought Communist soldiers at Prasaut. In the fighting, at least 89 Vietnamese civilians were killed in a "crossfire," which observers believed here as elsewhere to be a Government euphemism for massacre. 57 The Cambodians were pushed back by Sunday, April 12, however, and Svayrieng Province east of Prasaut was reported to be under complete Communist control. 58 On the same day, the Lon Nol Government rounded up 400 Vietnamese civilians for detention in Neak Luong (north of the future embattled town of Saang on the Mekong).59 It is important to note at this stage, only two weeks away from Nixon's "foreign invasion" that Pnompenh military men despite their penchant for hyperbole were noting that the Communist action in Svayrieng was "not based on military needs but intended to shake the fragile new Government." 60 Despite this, or maybe because of it, the United States and South Vietnamese armed forces forthwith stepped up the tempo of the Cambodian fighting. On April 15, fully 2,000 South Vietnamese rangers with only 100 Cambodian troops combined in an attack on Communist bases " a mile inside the Cambodian border" near Bavet in Parrot's Beak. 61 The assaults here, "like most of those carried out by the South Vietnamese troops in combat areas, were advised, supplied and supported by the American military command."62 The AP reported that two American CIA members fle into Svayrieng town to direct and coordinate military operations bu allied and Cambodian armies, 63 and CBS television correspondent Gary Sheppard filmed more South Vietnamese troops crossing the border on April 16 before he was shooed away by American military police. 64 Challanged about this second massive border incursion, a South Vietnamese spokesman said that a few rangers might have crossed the border, but "it was only a mistake by a very small unit" because "the border is hard to define." 65 The day after this mistake, on April 17, South Vietnamese troops again streamed into the Parrot's Beak. 66 With reports of this second major allied operation over the border pouring in, Washington [insert]"To protect our men who are in Vietnam and to guarantee the continued success of our withdrawal and Vietnamization program I have concluded that the time has come for action. . . Tonight American and South Vietnamese units will attack the headquarters for the entire Communist military operation in South Vietnam..." Richard M. Nixon President of the United States Washington, D.C. April 30, 1970 could not remain inactively neutral. Ellsworth Bunker, fresh from his scoldings for not following orders to intercede on behalf of Senator Chau earlier in the year, met with Thieu for forty-five minutes on April 18. Afterwards, United States sources in Saigon reported that South Vietnam "is fully aware" of the American stand - that the borders and sovereignty of Cambodia must be respected."67 Back in Washington, "diplomatic sources" took the sting out of this Bunker- Thieu shaft of Newspeak by acknowledging the Cambodian-allied agreement of three weeks standing for "limited attacks" inside Cambodia by American-advised South Vietnamese troops.68 While this agreement was in effect, the sources added, the United States had decided publicly to express respect for Cambodia neutrality.69 Whether by plan or because of the increasing publicity in the press, some of the South Vietnamese returned from Cambodia on April 19. 70 Meanwhile, having experienced several allied Cambodian offensives in less than a month and with more on the way, the Communists inside Cambodia with whatever indigenous support was available.71 responded in mid-April with their "foreign invasion." It appeared that this was another, stronger effort by the Communists to frighten Lon Nol away from his belligerent posturing. The Communists never attempted to advance on Pnompenh, although they demonstrated very clearly that they could if they wanted to. Before Lon Nol could relent, however, his gamble on American anti-Communist fears had paid off. On April 16, as South Vietnamese rangers and American fire power bolstered the handful of one hundred Cambodians in Parrot's Beak. Communist forces staged a night raid on the town of Takeo south of Pnompenh on Route 3. 72 The next day, April 17, Cambodian soldiers in Takeo shot 100 Vietnamese civilians including 30 children, who had been under detention in a grade school. 73 On April 18, UPI reported 5,000 Communists encircling Takeo, while in Parrot's Beak they were beginning to regain Prasaut. 74 On April 19, probably driven westward by the South Vietnamese offensive of April 15-19, the Communists struck again southwest of Pnompenh, this time less than 20 miles away in the Highway 1 town of Saang: Cambodian troops began withdrawing without a fight. 75 In the following two days, April 20 and 21. Takeo remained practically incommunicado, and the twon of Angtassom to the west was embattled as Cambodian troops struggled unsuccessfully to hold it. Fighting continued in Parrot's Beak as thousands of South Vietnamese with American support hounded Communist supply bases. But the biggest worry was the enemy's hold on Saang and the Cambodians' inability to shake it. The Communists did not advance any closer to Pnompenh from either the east or the south, despite the convincing battlefield evidence which (CAMBODIA cont. on page 23) [hand drawn cartoon] NOW- THERE'S NO NEED FOR ALARM ... WE'RE ONLY GOING TO BE IN YOUR COUNTRY FOR A COUPLE OF MONTHS OR SO... R.COBB 11