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University of Iowa anti-war protests, 1970

1970-10-07 ""Iowa City People's Peace Treaty Committee"" Page 14

thailand:
Subcontacting Counter-insurgency 
* for footnotes see CCAS Bulletin, vol. 3, A1 Al McCoy
(from an article to be published in the Bulletin of the Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars)

We are just now beginning to realize that many academic departments and foreign studies centers specializing in South East Asia are consciously supporting the war and related counterinsurgency efforts . . . In my discussion of the U.S. counterinsurgency program in Thailand, I will pose and answer four basic questions which hopefully will place this academic involvement in a clearer perspective. These questions are:
1) Why is there a counterinsurgency program in NE Thailand?
2) What is the nature of this program?
3) How does the counterinsurgency research of U.S. academics relate to this program?
4) What are the consequences for the people of Thailand?

The Need for a Counterinsurgency Program
With the Viet Minh Pathet Lao offensive in Laos in 1953-54 and the fall of Dien Bien Phy in 1954, U.S. strategic planners began to look to Thailand as a secure base for military operations in SE Asia. The U.S. defensive strategy for the region was defined by John Foster Dulles in January, 1954 in his "massive retaliation" speech. According to Dulles, the U.S. would provide aid for the expansion and modernization of native armies which would be able to hold the southward surge of China's armies long enough for the U.S. to launch a massive airstrike at China's industry and communications ... 1
From 1954 -62 the U.S. spent a modest $97.5 million on seven Royal Thai airbases, and two major highways linking the base at Udorn in the Northeast with Bangkok and Northcentral Thailand. Following the Laotian crisis of May, 1962, when 4500 U.S. Marines were flown into Udorn, interest in the Northeast increased somewhat, and this limited complex of bases and connecting highways was improved...2
From 1965-69 the U.S. government (following the launching of the bombing campaign in North Vietnam) spent over $600 million on such programs as the construction of an aircraft munitions port at Sattahip, expansion of roads from Sattahip to the Northeast's airbases for the shipment of bombs, air communications, and expanded base facilities. 8 The combination of this enormous air logistic complex and its costly aircraft gave these bases a strategic significance second only to Saigon and the Major U.S. bases in Vietnam. 
However, the huge investment of American resources and the enormous strategic importance of this complex did have its Achilles heel - a local revolutionary movement. Since even the smallest guerrilla movement could destroy millions of dollars of equipment and damage the effectiveness of the air war with a few well-placed mortar rounds or rockets, even the smallest local incident became a matter of vital concern to the U.S.military.. .Thus, in 1964-65, it became imperative to launch a massive pre-emptive counterinsurgency program in Northeast Thailand to protect the complex of U.S. airbases from possible local insurgency...

The U.S. Counterinsurgency Program in Thailand
After 1964, the pressing demand for an effective counterinsurgency program resulted in the subordination of almost all non-military government funding for Thailand to the goals of the counterinsurgency program. Beginning in 1964, USAID began to concentrate over 75% of its total aid funds for counterinsurgency work in North and Northeast Thailand. As AID administrator, Robert H.Nooter explained in 1969:
The primary threat to Thailand's security and consequently to U.S. interests in Thailand is the insurgency described briefly above. Our aid, therefore, is concentrated largely on assisting Thai counterinsurgency programs of various sorts and is supplied on grant basis to cover foreign exchange costs of U.S. technicians, training, and commodities. 
The largest single component of counterinsurgency effort is the rural security program. In essence, this program is an attempt to train, equip, and finance the Thai National Police Force so that they will be able to locate and crush any local insurgency before it gets out of hand. Under this program the number of personel in the Border Patrol Police (BPP) has increased 40% since 1965, and the Provincial police have grown 36% in the same period. 11 A.I.D. has enabled the police to expand its control to the village level, by financing the construction of over 900 local police stations (mainly in the Northeast), while it has increased the mobility of the BPP and Provincial police by providing helicopters and aircraft for their Air Support Division in the North and Northeast.12 Each of the appointed village headmen had been given a two way radio which he can use to call in police and troops, and his authority has been further augmented by the creation of a village police force responsible to him. Under the direction of 368 Green Beret officers and men, A.I.D. has established 5 police counterinsurgency schools in the North and Northeast. 13
Moreover, the United States Information Service (USIS) has established 12 provincial propaganda centers to train and assist the Thai government in improving the level of its anti-communist publications and broadcasts. This program has involved the establishment of a 100 -kw Hill Tribe radio station at Chiang Mai for "psychological" broadcasts to various tribes. 14
The office of Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency in the U.S. Embassy in Bangkok is nominally responsible for the overall direction and coordination of the various counterinsurgency programs. However, in the Northeast where even the smallest insurgency can have serious consequences for U.S. military operations, actual authority rests with the military and intelligence commanders at Udorn AFB. In recognition of this situation, the embassy has created a special consul for Northeast Thailand responsible for co-ordinating counter insurgency operations between the airforce, the C.I.A., A.I.D., and the Thai government in that region. 17

The Need for Academic Expertese in Counterinsurgency Programs
The military and civilian planners who began to plan this counterinsurgency effort in Thailand in 1964 could no longer work with the same false confidence which had pervaded similar programs in Vietnam in the late 1950's and early 1960's. The United States had spent several hundred million dollars financing a modernization and expansion of the Army of the Republic of South Vietnam and had tried to use it to break the growing NLF movement - and had failed miserably. In fact, the largest single U.S. counterinsurgency program, the strategic hamlets, had severely oppressed the rural population and strengthened the NLF's popular base. There was a general feeling among all but the most conservative military officials that "next time" a counterinsurgency program must be much more carefully planned, executed, and supervised if it were to succeed. 
General Maxwell Taylor (former U.S. ambassador to South Vietnam and architect of early counterinsurgency theories) articulated these sentiments at a Defense Department Jason Conference on Thailand in 1967.

Looking back at my Vietnam experience the most serious problem was getting basic data soon enough. Their data and our graphs in Washington were not worth a damn. Our people were staying in Saigon. To correct this situation in Thailand would be a major contribution. You need people who are students of Thailand, ethnology etc. We don't get enough people in our government who have that kind of background ... We would like methodical surveys, frequently repeated to get trend data, 18

Since insurgency "exploited" social problems and could be eliminated by eradicating such problems, a counterinsurgency program required vast amounts of the most minute basic data on all aspects of the client society. George Tanham, Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency in Thailand, saw this essential unity of academic research and military intelligence. 

Well, I think in my field, at least, counterinsurgency area , it is difficult to make a distinction of which subjects are of value to the military and which are of value to the civilians, because there is such an overlap and intermingling of things, so I think some of the subjects they [ ARPA ] have done, for example, the Meo handbook is sort of anthropology and sociology, if you like, but it is of equal value to the military advisor and the Thai military to bring out a Thai version, and it is much value to the civilians. 

Responsibility for the research and design of the U.S. counterinsurgency program in Thailand was assigned to the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) of the Department of Defense. ARPA's responsibilities were described in 1969 by U.S. Ambassador Leonard Unger. 

The Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) of the Department of Defense has underway a program of applied military Research and Development conducted jointly with the Ministry of  Defense in Thailand, with the following objectives:
(1) Working with the pertinent Thai researchers to describe and design the most effective R.T.G. measures to counter the insurgent threat;
(2) Research counterinsurgency topics in response to ad hoc requests generated by the U.S. Mission ; and 
(3) Help develop a Thai Ministry of Defense capability to define, manage and perform military research. 
Some illustrative programs ... are: the design and establishment, as a pilot project, of Thailand's first continuously updated storage and retrieval system for counterinsurgency intelligence data keyed to the country's 39,000 villages; a manual concerning the Meo, a non-Thai ethnic minority presently being infiltrated by the Communists and development within the Royal Thai Air Force of a capability to perform [deleted] reconnaissance. 
The major group responsible for initiating, channeling, and directing basic anthropological field research for ARPA in the critical mountain areas is the Tribal Research Center (TRC) at Chiang Mai. Its research functions involved a variety of tasks which included channeling all anthropological research on hill areas so that it would complement ARPA's data for the Border Patrol Police 24 and hosting a series of academic discussions on a variety of tribal problems for the Thai and U.S. operational counterinsurgency groups. 25
Since the demands for detailed knowledge of Thailand's rural areas came so quickly in 1964-65, it was impossible for ARPA to rely solely on original research such as that conducted by the TRC and cooperating anthropologists. It was necessary to set up a specialized committee to gather all past research and personal experience of various academic field workers and present it in a clear, usable form. This, in 1966 some of the most prominent academic specialists in Thai studies formed the Academic Advisory Council for Thailand (AACT). Using the University of California as a cover, the AACT signed a contract with A.I.D. in 1966 to fulfill certain functions which are described in its 1968 contract amendment:

A. General Objectives
The overall objective of this contract is to make available the resources of the Contractor, including personnel, to support and strengthen the operations of the U.S. aid 
14

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thailand: Subcontacting Counter-insurgency * for footnotes see CCAS Bulletin, vol. 3, A1 Al McCoy (from an article to be published in the Bulletin of the Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars) We are just now beginning to realize that many academic departments and foreign studies centers specializing in South East Asia are consciously supporting the war and related counterinsurgency efforts . . . In my discussion of the U.S. counterinsurgency program in Thailand, I will pose and answer four basic questions which hopefully will place this academic involvement in a clearer perspective. These questions are: 1) Why is there a counterinsurgency program in NE Thailand? 2) What is the nature of this program? 3) How does the counterinsurgency research of U.S. academics relate to this program? 4) What are the consequences for the people of Thailand? The Need for a Counterinsurgency Program With the Viet Minh Pathet Lao offensive in Laos in 1953-54 and the fall of Dien Bien Phy in 1954, U.S. strategic planners began to look to Thailand as a secure base for military operations in SE Asia. The U.S. defensive strategy for the region was defined by John Foster Dulles in January, 1954 in his "massive retaliation" speech. According to Dulles, the U.S. would provide aid for the expansion and modernization of native armies which would be able to hold the southward surge of China's armies long enough for the U.S. to launch a massive airstrike at China's industry and communications ... 1 From 1954 -62 the U.S. spent a modest $97.5 million on seven Royal Thai airbases, and two major highways linking the base at Udorn in the Northeast with Bangkok and Northcentral Thailand. Following the Laotian crisis of May, 1962, when 4500 U.S. Marines were flown into Udorn, interest in the Northeast increased somewhat, and this limited complex of bases and connecting highways was improved...2 From 1965-69 the U.S. government (following the launching of the bombing campaign in North Vietnam) spent over $600 million on such programs as the construction of an aircraft munitions port at Sattahip, expansion of roads from Sattahip to the Northeast's airbases for the shipment of bombs, air communications, and expanded base facilities. 8 The combination of this enormous air logistic complex and its costly aircraft gave these bases a strategic significance second only to Saigon and the Major U.S. bases in Vietnam. However, the huge investment of American resources and the enormous strategic importance of this complex did have its Achilles heel - a local revolutionary movement. Since even the smallest guerrilla movement could destroy millions of dollars of equipment and damage the effectiveness of the air war with a few well-placed mortar rounds or rockets, even the smallest local incident became a matter of vital concern to the U.S.military.. .Thus, in 1964-65, it became imperative to launch a massive pre-emptive counterinsurgency program in Northeast Thailand to protect the complex of U.S. airbases from possible local insurgency... The U.S. Counterinsurgency Program in Thailand After 1964, the pressing demand for an effective counterinsurgency program resulted in the subordination of almost all non-military government funding for Thailand to the goals of the counterinsurgency program. Beginning in 1964, USAID began to concentrate over 75% of its total aid funds for counterinsurgency work in North and Northeast Thailand. As AID administrator, Robert H.Nooter explained in 1969: The primary threat to Thailand's security and consequently to U.S. interests in Thailand is the insurgency described briefly above. Our aid, therefore, is concentrated largely on assisting Thai counterinsurgency programs of various sorts and is supplied on grant basis to cover foreign exchange costs of U.S. technicians, training, and commodities. The largest single component of counterinsurgency effort is the rural security program. In essence, this program is an attempt to train, equip, and finance the Thai National Police Force so that they will be able to locate and crush any local insurgency before it gets out of hand. Under this program the number of personel in the Border Patrol Police (BPP) has increased 40% since 1965, and the Provincial police have grown 36% in the same period. 11 A.I.D. has enabled the police to expand its control to the village level, by financing the construction of over 900 local police stations (mainly in the Northeast), while it has increased the mobility of the BPP and Provincial police by providing helicopters and aircraft for their Air Support Division in the North and Northeast.12 Each of the appointed village headmen had been given a two way radio which he can use to call in police and troops, and his authority has been further augmented by the creation of a village police force responsible to him. Under the direction of 368 Green Beret officers and men, A.I.D. has established 5 police counterinsurgency schools in the North and Northeast. 13 Moreover, the United States Information Service (USIS) has established 12 provincial propaganda centers to train and assist the Thai government in improving the level of its anti-communist publications and broadcasts. This program has involved the establishment of a 100 -kw Hill Tribe radio station at Chiang Mai for "psychological" broadcasts to various tribes. 14 The office of Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency in the U.S. Embassy in Bangkok is nominally responsible for the overall direction and coordination of the various counterinsurgency programs. However, in the Northeast where even the smallest insurgency can have serious consequences for U.S. military operations, actual authority rests with the military and intelligence commanders at Udorn AFB. In recognition of this situation, the embassy has created a special consul for Northeast Thailand responsible for co-ordinating counter insurgency operations between the airforce, the C.I.A., A.I.D., and the Thai government in that region. 17 The Need for Academic Expertese in Counterinsurgency Programs The military and civilian planners who began to plan this counterinsurgency effort in Thailand in 1964 could no longer work with the same false confidence which had pervaded similar programs in Vietnam in the late 1950's and early 1960's. The United States had spent several hundred million dollars financing a modernization and expansion of the Army of the Republic of South Vietnam and had tried to use it to break the growing NLF movement - and had failed miserably. In fact, the largest single U.S. counterinsurgency program, the strategic hamlets, had severely oppressed the rural population and strengthened the NLF's popular base. There was a general feeling among all but the most conservative military officials that "next time" a counterinsurgency program must be much more carefully planned, executed, and supervised if it were to succeed. General Maxwell Taylor (former U.S. ambassador to South Vietnam and architect of early counterinsurgency theories) articulated these sentiments at a Defense Department Jason Conference on Thailand in 1967. Looking back at my Vietnam experience the most serious problem was getting basic data soon enough. Their data and our graphs in Washington were not worth a damn. Our people were staying in Saigon. To correct this situation in Thailand would be a major contribution. You need people who are students of Thailand, ethnology etc. We don't get enough people in our government who have that kind of background ... We would like methodical surveys, frequently repeated to get trend data, 18 Since insurgency "exploited" social problems and could be eliminated by eradicating such problems, a counterinsurgency program required vast amounts of the most minute basic data on all aspects of the client society. George Tanham, Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency in Thailand, saw this essential unity of academic research and military intelligence. Well, I think in my field, at least, counterinsurgency area , it is difficult to make a distinction of which subjects are of value to the military and which are of value to the civilians, because there is such an overlap and intermingling of things, so I think some of the subjects they [ ARPA ] have done, for example, the Meo handbook is sort of anthropology and sociology, if you like, but it is of equal value to the military advisor and the Thai military to bring out a Thai version, and it is much value to the civilians. Responsibility for the research and design of the U.S. counterinsurgency program in Thailand was assigned to the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) of the Department of Defense. ARPA's responsibilities were described in 1969 by U.S. Ambassador Leonard Unger. The Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) of the Department of Defense has underway a program of applied military Research and Development conducted jointly with the Ministry of Defense in Thailand, with the following objectives: (1) Working with the pertinent Thai researchers to describe and design the most effective R.T.G. measures to counter the insurgent threat; (2) Research counterinsurgency topics in response to ad hoc requests generated by the U.S. Mission ; and (3) Help develop a Thai Ministry of Defense capability to define, manage and perform military research. Some illustrative programs ... are: the design and establishment, as a pilot project, of Thailand's first continuously updated storage and retrieval system for counterinsurgency intelligence data keyed to the country's 39,000 villages; a manual concerning the Meo, a non-Thai ethnic minority presently being infiltrated by the Communists and development within the Royal Thai Air Force of a capability to perform [deleted] reconnaissance. The major group responsible for initiating, channeling, and directing basic anthropological field research for ARPA in the critical mountain areas is the Tribal Research Center (TRC) at Chiang Mai. Its research functions involved a variety of tasks which included channeling all anthropological research on hill areas so that it would complement ARPA's data for the Border Patrol Police 24 and hosting a series of academic discussions on a variety of tribal problems for the Thai and U.S. operational counterinsurgency groups. 25 Since the demands for detailed knowledge of Thailand's rural areas came so quickly in 1964-65, it was impossible for ARPA to rely solely on original research such as that conducted by the TRC and cooperating anthropologists. It was necessary to set up a specialized committee to gather all past research and personal experience of various academic field workers and present it in a clear, usable form. This, in 1966 some of the most prominent academic specialists in Thai studies formed the Academic Advisory Council for Thailand (AACT). Using the University of California as a cover, the AACT signed a contract with A.I.D. in 1966 to fulfill certain functions which are described in its 1968 contract amendment: A. General Objectives The overall objective of this contract is to make available the resources of the Contractor, including personnel, to support and strengthen the operations of the U.S. aid 14