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University of Iowa anti-war protests, 1970

1970-10-07 ""Iowa City People's Peace Treaty Committee"" Page 15

program in Thailand, particularly with respect to the research activities undertaken by the Research Division of USOM Thailand [subordinate to ARPA]. In so doing, the Contractor will provide support to facilitate the effective functioning of the Academic Advisory Council for Thailand (AACT) to insure its maximum contribution to accomplishment of the goals of the A.I.D. program in Thailand. 
B. Scope of Work and Operational Plan The Contractor, in conjunction with AACT, will provide the following services:
1. Identify research that is being, has been, or will be conducted in universities, foundations and other institutions which may relate to developmental and counterinsurgency activities in Thailand; evaluate index and make such research available to A.I.D. ; suggest and solicit research proposals relevant to A.I.D. activity in Thailand for consideration by A.I.D/W and U.S.O.M. Thailand. 
2. Identify, prepare and maintain a current inventory of American scholars with a specialized knowledge of or background in Thailand, which can be drawn upon by A.I.D. for its specialized needs ...
3. Meet requests of A.I.D./W and the USOM Research Division for assistance and suggestions in addressing issues affecting A.I.D. operations in Thailand. 
4. Analyze, evaluate, and make recommendations concerning reports, studies and proposals for study, including those prepared by USOM Research Division, which are referred for review by USOM and for A.I.D. Washington; such reviews would utilize the knowledge of scholars with background in Thailand.
5. Review and make recommendations concerning research plans, opportunities, problems. priorities and techniques of the USOM Research Division. 
6. Organize, coordinated and conduct meetings, seminars, or conferences under AACT auspices, dealing with development and counterinsurgency problems, issues and activities including research relating to A.I.D. operations in Thailand.29

AACT began a conscious effort to subvert almost every major academic body in the United States concerned with Thailand in an attempt to channel their priorities towards the imperatives of ARPA's research. AACT's executive secretary, David Wilson, is chairman of the Association of Asian Studies' Research Committee on Southeast Asia. AACT's members agreed that they would see the appointment of AACT president Lauriston Sharp to the executive committee of A.I,D's Southeast Asia Development Advisory Group (ironically enough, the group which originally created AACT).30
At the July 1969 meeting AACT members discussed the recruitment of capable academic personnel for USOM's Research and Evaluation Division,31 while in March 1970 AACT members agreed that they "will further undertake to specify research projects that are necessary or desirable; and seek people who would be prepared to undertake such research." 32
The Stanford Research Institute, which had always drawn heavily on the resources of Stanford's academic departments, has contacted directly with ARPA for at least five major research projects in Thailand since 1962. SRI research has involved the cooperative testing and development (with Cornell's Aeronautics Lab and Michigan's Willow run Laboratories) of infrared photographic techniques for pinpointing guerilla encampments, analysis of "patterns of Communist terrorist crop cultivation," and discussion of the varieties of physical torture to make a guerilla suspect give up information. 
One of the critical failings of earlier U.S. counterinsurgency programs in South Vietnam was the inability to monitor effectively the ongoing impact of the program on the local population. ARPA sought to prevent a repetition of this failure by contracting a private firm. American Institutes for Research (AIR) which was staffed on a full and part-time basis by PhD's and faculty members of various universities. 
AIR's general approach for evaluating the efficiency of the counterinsurgency program fused behavioral science with military operations in a most "exciting " fashion:

The offer of food in exchange for certain services affords a convenient example. if this has in the past been a strong stimulus, it can probably be weakened by the increasing local agricultural production. If it has been a weak or neutral stimulus, it can probably be strengthened by burning the crops. 37
AIR was awarded a two-year, $1 million contract by ARPA and like AACT, it had cooperated extensively with USOM's Research and Evaluation Division. 38
While this rigorous divison of labor among the various academic groups has not doubt increased the efficiency of ARPA's program, it has also had significant consequences for the domestic debates in the United States and Australia over academic involvement in counterinsurgency work. Although all the known contracts of these academic groups state quite clearly that their specific function is an integral part of a larger effort, when criticized each has used its functional specificity to deny or minimize its involvement in counterinsurgency research. Defenders of AACT claim " We did no research , we only advised," while Australia anthropologists who have directed the TRC by arguing "We did not advise in counterinsurgency policy, we only did basic research."

Consequences of the U.S. Counterinsurgency Program for the People of Thailand. 

While the U.S. counterinsurgency program has had little impact on the relatively stable society of lowland central Thailand, it has had disastrous consequences for the historically more volatile Northeast and North. Although the continuous low-level dissidence in these regions went unnoticed before 1955 and was paid only minor attention until 1964, the construction of the vulnerable U.S. airbase complex and its 

[map]

bomb transport highways in the Northeast made it absolutely imperative to crush even the most minor disturbance quickly. Since the consequences of insurgency could be so disastrous for the U.S., it was necessary to wipe out the rebels first and ask questions later, if at all. 
Typical of this changing response to local problems and dissidence was the counterinsurgency work against the Lom Sak Meo from 1967 to 1969. Until 1967 the Lom Sak meo lived in a mountain area straddling Route 12 which had been built by U.S. aid funds in the 1950's to link the North and Northeast and serve as a firebreak and access route against advancing armies. The eight Meo villages to the south of Route 12 were a relatively recent development. Previously, all of the Meo in the Lom Sak vicinity had lived in a triangular area to the north of the road. However, population had increased and half of the 6000 Meo moved into the uninhabited hills to the south of Route 12 to survive.
Although this move went unnoticed for a number of years, growing concern about the consequences of insurgency throughout the North and Northeast finally brought a survey team into the area in July and August of 1967. The Border Patrol Police then ordered the Meo to move to the north of the road. The reason for this decision was simple; since Route 12 was a "firebreak" road intended to contain the southward spread of insurgents it was poor strategy to have potential insurgents on both sides of such a crucial highway. 
In January, 1968 the BPP trucked the Meos out of their old villages, across Route 12, and into new village sites in the northern triangle.  Although the Meo did manage to get in a crop in early 1968, the disruption of the forced move resulted in a poor harvest in early November. The BPP had promised the Meo relief supplies, but they had "disappeared" somewhere in the police hierarchy. Thus, in November the Meo were faced with a critical situation; they would either have to steal food from the valley towns or starve.
In mid-November the Meo began to steal food from urban storage areas, and when the BPP interfered the Meo responded predictably by attacking nearby camps at which the BPP were training Meo for counterinsurgency work. All the Meo in those camps deserted to the insurgents, and soon the local BPP were outnumbered, surrounded and without water. 41 The initial government response was to send in some army troops, reinforcements for the BPP and helicopters from the Police Mobile Air Reserve.43 Nevertheless, the poorly armed Meo guerrillas bested government troops at every turn and the full-scale revolt became a source of embarrasment to Bangkok's military leadership. On December 7 it was announced that the Third Army had joined the battle and it was expected that its armored personnel carriers, heavy tactical air strikes and large scale burnings of forest would "clear the triangle" within a few days. 47
Despite these encouraging words and several premature announcements of the revolt's collapse. the Meo continued to ambush the army and police units at will. The government began to excuse its failure by explaining that Meos had acquired a number of helicopters for logistical support, were trained in Hanoi, Laos and China and were armed and supplied by china.49
Since the government could not defeat the Meos in combat, it moved to more extreme measures. On December 20 the government set up strategic hamlets and began dropping leaflets to the Meo warning them to surrender. When the Meos proved themselves to be of the Communist variety by failing to do so, the government withdrew its troops and jet aircraft flying out of Udorn began the systematic bombing and napalming of the region. "They must be got rid of once and for all" declared Air Marshal Dawee Chulasap. 52
The bombing continued throughout January, but by early February only 200 to 300 Meos had been "flushed out" into the refugee camps. The great majority of the Meos had been killed in the saturation bombing and only the fortunate few are still holding in the deepest recesses of Lom Sak's mountain triangle.53
Thus, a situation which could have been avoided completely or remained a petty scrap between local officials and tribesmen was transformed into a costly life-and-death struggle by the demands of the U.S. military. The U.S. had launched a massive bombing campaign from Thailand which gave Thai leaders reason to fear retaliation, cultivated the government's concern over counterinsurgency in order to protest the U.S. military apparatus, and finally built up Thai armaments to the point where it was much simpler to obliterate dissenting communists than to deal with the,. And when a small network of communists in a insignificant mountain recess resisted the government in a rational, traditional fashion, the research and information gathering on the tribes by AACT and the TRC , the training of the Border Patrol Police by the A.I.D., TRC and Special Forces, highway communications constructed by Acclerated Rural Development, the counterinsurgency contingencies developed by Stanford Research Institute and American Institutes for Research, and the training and equipping of the Thai Air Force by the USAF - all swung into action like the precision mechanism it had become. And it smoothly, efficiently "eliminated" this bothersome little problem in the mountain recesses of northeasterrn Thailand 
In light of the contracts these academics have knowingly signed, the advice and research they have given to counterinsurgency agencies and the consequences for the people whom they have studied, the failure of the American Association of Anthropologists and the Association of Asian Studies to withdraw their academic cover from intelligence operations is a clearcut case of ethical failure and collective complicity. If the academic associations continue to harbor such para-military personnel it will become necessary for the ethical members of the university community to deny the para-militarists academic cover by driving them off the camps and into the intelligence agencies where they belong.

[insert]"The United States is carrying 78 percent of the cost of the Indo-Chinese war."
Christian Pineau 
Deputy in the French National Assembly
Paris, France
March 16, 1954

15

Saving...

program in Thailand, particularly with respect to the research activities undertaken by the Research Division of USOM Thailand [subordinate to ARPA]. In so doing, the Contractor will provide support to facilitate the effective functioning of the Academic Advisory Council for Thailand (AACT) to insure its maximum contribution to accomplishment of the goals of the A.I.D. program in Thailand. B. Scope of Work and Operational Plan The Contractor, in conjunction with AACT, will provide the following services: 1. Identify research that is being, has been, or will be conducted in universities, foundations and other institutions which may relate to developmental and counterinsurgency activities in Thailand; evaluate index and make such research available to A.I.D. ; suggest and solicit research proposals relevant to A.I.D. activity in Thailand for consideration by A.I.D/W and U.S.O.M. Thailand. 2. Identify, prepare and maintain a current inventory of American scholars with a specialized knowledge of or background in Thailand, which can be drawn upon by A.I.D. for its specialized needs ... 3. Meet requests of A.I.D./W and the USOM Research Division for assistance and suggestions in addressing issues affecting A.I.D. operations in Thailand. 4. Analyze, evaluate, and make recommendations concerning reports, studies and proposals for study, including those prepared by USOM Research Division, which are referred for review by USOM and for A.I.D. Washington; such reviews would utilize the knowledge of scholars with background in Thailand. 5. Review and make recommendations concerning research plans, opportunities, problems. priorities and techniques of the USOM Research Division. 6. Organize, coordinated and conduct meetings, seminars, or conferences under AACT auspices, dealing with development and counterinsurgency problems, issues and activities including research relating to A.I.D. operations in Thailand.29 AACT began a conscious effort to subvert almost every major academic body in the United States concerned with Thailand in an attempt to channel their priorities towards the imperatives of ARPA's research. AACT's executive secretary, David Wilson, is chairman of the Association of Asian Studies' Research Committee on Southeast Asia. AACT's members agreed that they would see the appointment of AACT president Lauriston Sharp to the executive committee of A.I,D's Southeast Asia Development Advisory Group (ironically enough, the group which originally created AACT).30 At the July 1969 meeting AACT members discussed the recruitment of capable academic personnel for USOM's Research and Evaluation Division,31 while in March 1970 AACT members agreed that they "will further undertake to specify research projects that are necessary or desirable; and seek people who would be prepared to undertake such research." 32 The Stanford Research Institute, which had always drawn heavily on the resources of Stanford's academic departments, has contacted directly with ARPA for at least five major research projects in Thailand since 1962. SRI research has involved the cooperative testing and development (with Cornell's Aeronautics Lab and Michigan's Willow run Laboratories) of infrared photographic techniques for pinpointing guerilla encampments, analysis of "patterns of Communist terrorist crop cultivation," and discussion of the varieties of physical torture to make a guerilla suspect give up information. One of the critical failings of earlier U.S. counterinsurgency programs in South Vietnam was the inability to monitor effectively the ongoing impact of the program on the local population. ARPA sought to prevent a repetition of this failure by contracting a private firm. American Institutes for Research (AIR) which was staffed on a full and part-time basis by PhD's and faculty members of various universities. AIR's general approach for evaluating the efficiency of the counterinsurgency program fused behavioral science with military operations in a most "exciting " fashion: The offer of food in exchange for certain services affords a convenient example. if this has in the past been a strong stimulus, it can probably be weakened by the increasing local agricultural production. If it has been a weak or neutral stimulus, it can probably be strengthened by burning the crops. 37 AIR was awarded a two-year, $1 million contract by ARPA and like AACT, it had cooperated extensively with USOM's Research and Evaluation Division. 38 While this rigorous divison of labor among the various academic groups has not doubt increased the efficiency of ARPA's program, it has also had significant consequences for the domestic debates in the United States and Australia over academic involvement in counterinsurgency work. Although all the known contracts of these academic groups state quite clearly that their specific function is an integral part of a larger effort, when criticized each has used its functional specificity to deny or minimize its involvement in counterinsurgency research. Defenders of AACT claim " We did no research , we only advised," while Australia anthropologists who have directed the TRC by arguing "We did not advise in counterinsurgency policy, we only did basic research." Consequences of the U.S. Counterinsurgency Program for the People of Thailand. While the U.S. counterinsurgency program has had little impact on the relatively stable society of lowland central Thailand, it has had disastrous consequences for the historically more volatile Northeast and North. Although the continuous low-level dissidence in these regions went unnoticed before 1955 and was paid only minor attention until 1964, the construction of the vulnerable U.S. airbase complex and its [map] bomb transport highways in the Northeast made it absolutely imperative to crush even the most minor disturbance quickly. Since the consequences of insurgency could be so disastrous for the U.S., it was necessary to wipe out the rebels first and ask questions later, if at all. Typical of this changing response to local problems and dissidence was the counterinsurgency work against the Lom Sak Meo from 1967 to 1969. Until 1967 the Lom Sak meo lived in a mountain area straddling Route 12 which had been built by U.S. aid funds in the 1950's to link the North and Northeast and serve as a firebreak and access route against advancing armies. The eight Meo villages to the south of Route 12 were a relatively recent development. Previously, all of the Meo in the Lom Sak vicinity had lived in a triangular area to the north of the road. However, population had increased and half of the 6000 Meo moved into the uninhabited hills to the south of Route 12 to survive. Although this move went unnoticed for a number of years, growing concern about the consequences of insurgency throughout the North and Northeast finally brought a survey team into the area in July and August of 1967. The Border Patrol Police then ordered the Meo to move to the north of the road. The reason for this decision was simple; since Route 12 was a "firebreak" road intended to contain the southward spread of insurgents it was poor strategy to have potential insurgents on both sides of such a crucial highway. In January, 1968 the BPP trucked the Meos out of their old villages, across Route 12, and into new village sites in the northern triangle. Although the Meo did manage to get in a crop in early 1968, the disruption of the forced move resulted in a poor harvest in early November. The BPP had promised the Meo relief supplies, but they had "disappeared" somewhere in the police hierarchy. Thus, in November the Meo were faced with a critical situation; they would either have to steal food from the valley towns or starve. In mid-November the Meo began to steal food from urban storage areas, and when the BPP interfered the Meo responded predictably by attacking nearby camps at which the BPP were training Meo for counterinsurgency work. All the Meo in those camps deserted to the insurgents, and soon the local BPP were outnumbered, surrounded and without water. 41 The initial government response was to send in some army troops, reinforcements for the BPP and helicopters from the Police Mobile Air Reserve.43 Nevertheless, the poorly armed Meo guerrillas bested government troops at every turn and the full-scale revolt became a source of embarrasment to Bangkok's military leadership. On December 7 it was announced that the Third Army had joined the battle and it was expected that its armored personnel carriers, heavy tactical air strikes and large scale burnings of forest would "clear the triangle" within a few days. 47 Despite these encouraging words and several premature announcements of the revolt's collapse. the Meo continued to ambush the army and police units at will. The government began to excuse its failure by explaining that Meos had acquired a number of helicopters for logistical support, were trained in Hanoi, Laos and China and were armed and supplied by china.49 Since the government could not defeat the Meos in combat, it moved to more extreme measures. On December 20 the government set up strategic hamlets and began dropping leaflets to the Meo warning them to surrender. When the Meos proved themselves to be of the Communist variety by failing to do so, the government withdrew its troops and jet aircraft flying out of Udorn began the systematic bombing and napalming of the region. "They must be got rid of once and for all" declared Air Marshal Dawee Chulasap. 52 The bombing continued throughout January, but by early February only 200 to 300 Meos had been "flushed out" into the refugee camps. The great majority of the Meos had been killed in the saturation bombing and only the fortunate few are still holding in the deepest recesses of Lom Sak's mountain triangle.53 Thus, a situation which could have been avoided completely or remained a petty scrap between local officials and tribesmen was transformed into a costly life-and-death struggle by the demands of the U.S. military. The U.S. had launched a massive bombing campaign from Thailand which gave Thai leaders reason to fear retaliation, cultivated the government's concern over counterinsurgency in order to protest the U.S. military apparatus, and finally built up Thai armaments to the point where it was much simpler to obliterate dissenting communists than to deal with the,. And when a small network of communists in a insignificant mountain recess resisted the government in a rational, traditional fashion, the research and information gathering on the tribes by AACT and the TRC , the training of the Border Patrol Police by the A.I.D., TRC and Special Forces, highway communications constructed by Acclerated Rural Development, the counterinsurgency contingencies developed by Stanford Research Institute and American Institutes for Research, and the training and equipping of the Thai Air Force by the USAF - all swung into action like the precision mechanism it had become. And it smoothly, efficiently "eliminated" this bothersome little problem in the mountain recesses of northeasterrn Thailand In light of the contracts these academics have knowingly signed, the advice and research they have given to counterinsurgency agencies and the consequences for the people whom they have studied, the failure of the American Association of Anthropologists and the Association of Asian Studies to withdraw their academic cover from intelligence operations is a clearcut case of ethical failure and collective complicity. If the academic associations continue to harbor such para-military personnel it will become necessary for the ethical members of the university community to deny the para-militarists academic cover by driving them off the camps and into the intelligence agencies where they belong. [insert]"The United States is carrying 78 percent of the cost of the Indo-Chinese war." Christian Pineau Deputy in the French National Assembly Paris, France March 16, 1954 15