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University of Iowa anti-war protests, 1970

1970-10-07 ""Iowa City People's Peace Treaty Committee"" Page 19

in June, 100.000 Saigon workers called for a general strike; on June 26, 60,000 of them joined students in calling for an end to the fighting. On July 11. the students issued a public statement demanding: 1) immediate withdrawal of foreign troops from South Vietnam and immediate end to support to the Thieu-Ky-Khiem triumvirate, and 2) that the question of peace be left to the Vietnamese to decide on the sole basis of self-determination. 
These long-withheld demands for peace did not remain a student monopoly. During the summer months, new anti-war organizations were formed to provide focus and direction for mounting public outage in all segments of South Vietnamese society. With familiar irony, their membership grew and solidified thanks to the government itself. For at the end of August, Thieu's police renewed their attacks against the student leaders, thereby provoking a new public denunciation of police brutality and repression. When the detained students initiated a hunger strike " to the death," students throughout the country demonstrated their solidarity by fasting with them. A group of mothers (two of them in their seventies) also joined the hunger strike, while professors and even university rectors dispatched letters of protest to Thieu. Yet despite these actions, and despite the fact that early in September, a high Saigon court had actually refused to try the students because "evidence of guilt are not clear enough," still the students were held and tortured for over a month before the government finally released them on October 5. 
This move did little to quell the dissent. In fact, the protests were expressed as far away as Paris, where on September 21, Deputy Ngo Cong Duc reiterated the student demands and called for a neutralist government in the South [see other article containing proposals.] At the same time, in Saigon, the anti-war groups moved to enlarge their base of support. On October 11, four of these organizations -- the Committee of Women Action for the Right to Live, the National Movement for Self-Determination, The High School Teachers Union, and the Student Committee for Human Rights - convened to discuss the possibility for forming a mass-based front. Over one thousand delegates, including students, workers, women, intellectuals, politicians and religious leaders, were present at this session. 
Three weeks later, on November 7, the principal spokesman of these groups met again in a pagoda near Saigon to pledge their official support for the new movement -- The Popular Front for the Defense of Peace ( Mat Tran Nhan Dan Tranh Thu Hoa Binh). In addition to the four groups responsible for organizing the October 11 meetings, other important organizations included the Catholic Labor Youth Movement, the Vietnamese Women's Association, the Buddhist Women's Federation, The Committee for Prison Reform, the National Progressive Force, the Progressive Labor Liasion Committee, various trade unions (dockworkers, railway workers, civil servants, vendors, petroleum workers, market workers and bank clerks), the Vietnamese Student Association, the Saigon and Van Hanh (Buddhist) Student Unions, and the 1965 Peace Action Committee. 
They do not advocate just "any" peace, and above all, not a Nixonian "peace," but an independent peace drawn up by Vietnamese for Vietnamese. In fact, the PFDP's position as expressed in their official ten-point manifesto is even stronger than that of the NFl/PRG. For rather than demand a "negotiated" withdrawal of American troops, they have called for 1) the departure of all U.S. and allied forces as a "necessary prerequisite" to stopping the fighting, and 2) the establishment of a "truly representative government so that the South Vietnamese people can establish an end to the war as soon as possible which corresponds to the wishes of the whole people." On the basis of the militancy of this manifesto, the representativeness of the coalition's membership. and the political prestige of its founders (man of whom actively opposed the arrival of American troops into the South in 1965 and who, until recently, were serving prison terms because of this opposition), attuned observers in Saigon consider its establishment to be the potentially most important political development since the Tet offensive. At any rate, the surfacing of the PFDP clearly demonstrates that the era of "attentisme" which has characterized South Vietnam's cities for so many years, is coming to an end. 
The coalition also signals a significant turning point in the very nature of "Saigon politics." Granted, the question of leadership poses a critical problem for PFDP. But its principal concern is one of issues rather than of personalities -- and therein lies the real strength of the new movement. For unlike many other "independent" groups which suddenly appeared (and just as suddenly failed) on the Saigon political scene in the past, the PFDP is a membership -- rather than leadership-orientated organization -- an organization which bases its appeal on a popular political platform rather than on the popularity of one or two political hopefuls, and which draws its support from the grass roots of urban society, rather than from a select group of professional politicos. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the PFDP represents a new attempt to recognize the most important reality of South Vietnamese po-

[insert]

litics as a whole: the strength of NFL/PRG. Although a "non-aligned" force, unlike so called "third force" elements the coalition has expressed its willingness to cooperate with the revolutionary forces; by the same token, the NLF has publicly stated that it would selcome the participation of forces represented by the PFDP in a coalition government. In this way, the new People's Front might well prove to be the crucial "missing link" between the resistance movement and the "legitimate" political interest groups in Saigon. 
Why has the American public been so ill informed about the development? Few U.S. newsmen in Saigon have contacts with Vietnamese outside the tiny ruling circles; most of them depend on JUSPAO (the official U.S. news agency in Saigon) for news about local politics. JUSPAO avoided any mention of the PFDP's formation. In formation about the coalition was censored in all but a half-dozen of Saigon's thirty odd newspapers. Only two Americans, Michael Morrow of Dispatch News Service and myself, were present at the November 7 meetings (as "unofficial observers") both of us were promptly expelled from South Vietnam. [ News about the PFDP and about the Saigon peace movement will continue to be suppressed. For it exposes only too clearly the duplicity of our government's claims to be defending the right of "self-determination" in Vietnam. This is the kind of news which will not only raise serious questions in the U.S. about the administration's role in that country, but will compel people to act against that administration. 
The struggle of the Vietnamese against the American and Saigon governments has been taken up with great conviction, enthusiasm and especially courage. The anti-war activists realize the enormous risks they run in challenging those in Saigon whose power and influence depend on prolonging the fighting. Sooner or later, Thieu , with American logistical support, will attempt to suppress this public dissension. Indeed, steps have already been taken in this direction. On January 6, the reputable French journal Le Monde cited reports than an attack launched by South Vietnamese shock troops against a group of protesting students (wounding thirty, four of them seriously) in Saigon on the evening of January 4 had been directed by four American "advisors" and that the latter had "themselves set up the tear gas grenades fired against the students seeking refuge in the students hostels." The reason for this demonstration of force ? The students returning from a peace meeting held at AnQuang pagoda, had begun to chant demands for the withdrawal of American and Korean troops. 
But the Saigon peace advocates will not be deterred by a few tear-gas grenades or even by a much more systematic campaign to silence their demands. When today's protestors have been jailed or exiled, new people will again come to the foreground to continue the struggle to end the war. Ultimately, they assure you, an independent peace will come -- whatever the costs. For the Vietnamese have no illusions about the real objectives of the so-called "Nixon doctrine." They know that "Vietnamization" simply means (to quote Ellsworth Bunker, the American ambassador to South Vietnam) "changing the color of the corpses." They know that Washington has in no way renounced its cynical plans of achieving the unachievable in Vietnam: a military victory. And they know that unless U.S. policy is defeated their land and their people will be granted neither peace nor life. 
Their message is directed to all Vietnamese, whatever their political opinions, their regional prejudices, or their class background. And their message is also directed to us in America. For now, more than ever, the resolution of the war depends on our understanding about what is really happening in Vietnam, and on our success in relating this truth to the need for a radical change in policy in Washington. It depends on our support for the Saigon peace movement -- for herein lies the strongest clue to date as to what is wrong with American intervention in Indochina: the imposition of an illegitimate regime in Saigon, the use of high technological terrorism as a means of breaking Vietnamese resistance and morale, and the grand scale use of making " Asians fight Asians," Finally it depends on our actions. 
" People's war" in Vietnam is intimately linked to the idea of a popular peace, a peace based on the aspirations of the whole nation, and a peace which can only be realized through the involvement of the people themselves. We must follow this example. We, the people of the United States, are not at war with the Vietnamese. And it is our right and our obligation to show both the Vietnamese and our fellow Americans that we will not support Nixon's war. This cannot be achieved through mere rhetoric. We must unite to bring our universities, our factories and offices, our neighborhoods, our cities, and even out states out of the war. We ourselves must declare a peace, a "people's peace." Only then will there be a real possibility for ending the war which is not only destroying Vietnam, but violating the human rights of all Americans as well. 

(continued from page 16) 
Proposals for Peace
freedom and national reconciliation in South Vietnam. 
4. All parties to the war must begin to deescalate the war. The Americans must stop the bombing and stop using harmful chemical products on the territory of South Vietnam. The National Liberation Front must halt all indiscriminate bombings by rockets or mortars, which victimize the innocent. 
- the right of self-determination can be genuinely achieved only through truly free elections, with no pressure flowing from the presence of foreign troops, and free from any intervention by any military or political force. 
We solemnly propose:
I. A deescalation of the war and a halt t all repression of the movements struggling for peace, independence, democracy, freedom, and national reconciliation through the following conditions: 1. The Americans must withdraw from the territory of South Vietnam all their forces and war II. When the above mentioned conditions have been fulfilled, the Paris Conference must be enlarged:
The Paris Conference on Vietnam currently consists of four parties: The American delegation, that of the Nguyen Van Thieu government, that of the National Liberation Front, and that of North Vietnam. But the overwhelming majority of the South Vietnamese population demanding peace, independence, democracy, freedom , and national reconciliation are not represented. 
This is why there must be a delegation representing the political and religious groups and forces struggling for peace, freedom, independence, democracy, and national reconciliation, in order that it may join the other delegations in finding a concerted solution to the problem in Vietnam.
III. With the seating of the delegation of the forces struggling for peace, independence, democracy, freedom and national reconciliation, the Conference will be able to proceed:
1. To discuss the conditions for a cease fire and for the withdrawal of the North Vietnamese forces from South Vietnam and to solve the problem of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam and the Army of the National Liberation Front.
2. To establish a neutral provisional government in South Vietnam. 
3. This neutral provisional government will have the task 
- of implementing the conditions agreed upon at the Paris Conference, 
- of normalizing political, cultural, and social activities in South Vietnam, 
- of establishing relations with North Vietnam, 
-of organizing free elections in South Vietnam. 
19

Saving...

in June, 100.000 Saigon workers called for a general strike; on June 26, 60,000 of them joined students in calling for an end to the fighting. On July 11. the students issued a public statement demanding: 1) immediate withdrawal of foreign troops from South Vietnam and immediate end to support to the Thieu-Ky-Khiem triumvirate, and 2) that the question of peace be left to the Vietnamese to decide on the sole basis of self-determination. These long-withheld demands for peace did not remain a student monopoly. During the summer months, new anti-war organizations were formed to provide focus and direction for mounting public outage in all segments of South Vietnamese society. With familiar irony, their membership grew and solidified thanks to the government itself. For at the end of August, Thieu's police renewed their attacks against the student leaders, thereby provoking a new public denunciation of police brutality and repression. When the detained students initiated a hunger strike " to the death," students throughout the country demonstrated their solidarity by fasting with them. A group of mothers (two of them in their seventies) also joined the hunger strike, while professors and even university rectors dispatched letters of protest to Thieu. Yet despite these actions, and despite the fact that early in September, a high Saigon court had actually refused to try the students because "evidence of guilt are not clear enough," still the students were held and tortured for over a month before the government finally released them on October 5. This move did little to quell the dissent. In fact, the protests were expressed as far away as Paris, where on September 21, Deputy Ngo Cong Duc reiterated the student demands and called for a neutralist government in the South [see other article containing proposals.] At the same time, in Saigon, the anti-war groups moved to enlarge their base of support. On October 11, four of these organizations -- the Committee of Women Action for the Right to Live, the National Movement for Self-Determination, The High School Teachers Union, and the Student Committee for Human Rights - convened to discuss the possibility for forming a mass-based front. Over one thousand delegates, including students, workers, women, intellectuals, politicians and religious leaders, were present at this session. Three weeks later, on November 7, the principal spokesman of these groups met again in a pagoda near Saigon to pledge their official support for the new movement -- The Popular Front for the Defense of Peace ( Mat Tran Nhan Dan Tranh Thu Hoa Binh). In addition to the four groups responsible for organizing the October 11 meetings, other important organizations included the Catholic Labor Youth Movement, the Vietnamese Women's Association, the Buddhist Women's Federation, The Committee for Prison Reform, the National Progressive Force, the Progressive Labor Liasion Committee, various trade unions (dockworkers, railway workers, civil servants, vendors, petroleum workers, market workers and bank clerks), the Vietnamese Student Association, the Saigon and Van Hanh (Buddhist) Student Unions, and the 1965 Peace Action Committee. They do not advocate just "any" peace, and above all, not a Nixonian "peace," but an independent peace drawn up by Vietnamese for Vietnamese. In fact, the PFDP's position as expressed in their official ten-point manifesto is even stronger than that of the NFl/PRG. For rather than demand a "negotiated" withdrawal of American troops, they have called for 1) the departure of all U.S. and allied forces as a "necessary prerequisite" to stopping the fighting, and 2) the establishment of a "truly representative government so that the South Vietnamese people can establish an end to the war as soon as possible which corresponds to the wishes of the whole people." On the basis of the militancy of this manifesto, the representativeness of the coalition's membership. and the political prestige of its founders (man of whom actively opposed the arrival of American troops into the South in 1965 and who, until recently, were serving prison terms because of this opposition), attuned observers in Saigon consider its establishment to be the potentially most important political development since the Tet offensive. At any rate, the surfacing of the PFDP clearly demonstrates that the era of "attentisme" which has characterized South Vietnam's cities for so many years, is coming to an end. The coalition also signals a significant turning point in the very nature of "Saigon politics." Granted, the question of leadership poses a critical problem for PFDP. But its principal concern is one of issues rather than of personalities -- and therein lies the real strength of the new movement. For unlike many other "independent" groups which suddenly appeared (and just as suddenly failed) on the Saigon political scene in the past, the PFDP is a membership -- rather than leadership-orientated organization -- an organization which bases its appeal on a popular political platform rather than on the popularity of one or two political hopefuls, and which draws its support from the grass roots of urban society, rather than from a select group of professional politicos. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the PFDP represents a new attempt to recognize the most important reality of South Vietnamese po- [insert] litics as a whole: the strength of NFL/PRG. Although a "non-aligned" force, unlike so called "third force" elements the coalition has expressed its willingness to cooperate with the revolutionary forces; by the same token, the NLF has publicly stated that it would selcome the participation of forces represented by the PFDP in a coalition government. In this way, the new People's Front might well prove to be the crucial "missing link" between the resistance movement and the "legitimate" political interest groups in Saigon. Why has the American public been so ill informed about the development? Few U.S. newsmen in Saigon have contacts with Vietnamese outside the tiny ruling circles; most of them depend on JUSPAO (the official U.S. news agency in Saigon) for news about local politics. JUSPAO avoided any mention of the PFDP's formation. In formation about the coalition was censored in all but a half-dozen of Saigon's thirty odd newspapers. Only two Americans, Michael Morrow of Dispatch News Service and myself, were present at the November 7 meetings (as "unofficial observers") both of us were promptly expelled from South Vietnam. [ News about the PFDP and about the Saigon peace movement will continue to be suppressed. For it exposes only too clearly the duplicity of our government's claims to be defending the right of "self-determination" in Vietnam. This is the kind of news which will not only raise serious questions in the U.S. about the administration's role in that country, but will compel people to act against that administration. The struggle of the Vietnamese against the American and Saigon governments has been taken up with great conviction, enthusiasm and especially courage. The anti-war activists realize the enormous risks they run in challenging those in Saigon whose power and influence depend on prolonging the fighting. Sooner or later, Thieu , with American logistical support, will attempt to suppress this public dissension. Indeed, steps have already been taken in this direction. On January 6, the reputable French journal Le Monde cited reports than an attack launched by South Vietnamese shock troops against a group of protesting students (wounding thirty, four of them seriously) in Saigon on the evening of January 4 had been directed by four American "advisors" and that the latter had "themselves set up the tear gas grenades fired against the students seeking refuge in the students hostels." The reason for this demonstration of force ? The students returning from a peace meeting held at AnQuang pagoda, had begun to chant demands for the withdrawal of American and Korean troops. But the Saigon peace advocates will not be deterred by a few tear-gas grenades or even by a much more systematic campaign to silence their demands. When today's protestors have been jailed or exiled, new people will again come to the foreground to continue the struggle to end the war. Ultimately, they assure you, an independent peace will come -- whatever the costs. For the Vietnamese have no illusions about the real objectives of the so-called "Nixon doctrine." They know that "Vietnamization" simply means (to quote Ellsworth Bunker, the American ambassador to South Vietnam) "changing the color of the corpses." They know that Washington has in no way renounced its cynical plans of achieving the unachievable in Vietnam: a military victory. And they know that unless U.S. policy is defeated their land and their people will be granted neither peace nor life. Their message is directed to all Vietnamese, whatever their political opinions, their regional prejudices, or their class background. And their message is also directed to us in America. For now, more than ever, the resolution of the war depends on our understanding about what is really happening in Vietnam, and on our success in relating this truth to the need for a radical change in policy in Washington. It depends on our support for the Saigon peace movement -- for herein lies the strongest clue to date as to what is wrong with American intervention in Indochina: the imposition of an illegitimate regime in Saigon, the use of high technological terrorism as a means of breaking Vietnamese resistance and morale, and the grand scale use of making " Asians fight Asians," Finally it depends on our actions. " People's war" in Vietnam is intimately linked to the idea of a popular peace, a peace based on the aspirations of the whole nation, and a peace which can only be realized through the involvement of the people themselves. We must follow this example. We, the people of the United States, are not at war with the Vietnamese. And it is our right and our obligation to show both the Vietnamese and our fellow Americans that we will not support Nixon's war. This cannot be achieved through mere rhetoric. We must unite to bring our universities, our factories and offices, our neighborhoods, our cities, and even out states out of the war. We ourselves must declare a peace, a "people's peace." Only then will there be a real possibility for ending the war which is not only destroying Vietnam, but violating the human rights of all Americans as well. (continued from page 16) Proposals for Peace freedom and national reconciliation in South Vietnam. 4. All parties to the war must begin to deescalate the war. The Americans must stop the bombing and stop using harmful chemical products on the territory of South Vietnam. The National Liberation Front must halt all indiscriminate bombings by rockets or mortars, which victimize the innocent. - the right of self-determination can be genuinely achieved only through truly free elections, with no pressure flowing from the presence of foreign troops, and free from any intervention by any military or political force. We solemnly propose: I. A deescalation of the war and a halt t all repression of the movements struggling for peace, independence, democracy, freedom, and national reconciliation through the following conditions: 1. The Americans must withdraw from the territory of South Vietnam all their forces and war II. When the above mentioned conditions have been fulfilled, the Paris Conference must be enlarged: The Paris Conference on Vietnam currently consists of four parties: The American delegation, that of the Nguyen Van Thieu government, that of the National Liberation Front, and that of North Vietnam. But the overwhelming majority of the South Vietnamese population demanding peace, independence, democracy, freedom , and national reconciliation are not represented. This is why there must be a delegation representing the political and religious groups and forces struggling for peace, freedom, independence, democracy, and national reconciliation, in order that it may join the other delegations in finding a concerted solution to the problem in Vietnam. III. With the seating of the delegation of the forces struggling for peace, independence, democracy, freedom and national reconciliation, the Conference will be able to proceed: 1. To discuss the conditions for a cease fire and for the withdrawal of the North Vietnamese forces from South Vietnam and to solve the problem of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam and the Army of the National Liberation Front. 2. To establish a neutral provisional government in South Vietnam. 3. This neutral provisional government will have the task - of implementing the conditions agreed upon at the Paris Conference, - of normalizing political, cultural, and social activities in South Vietnam, - of establishing relations with North Vietnam, -of organizing free elections in South Vietnam. 19