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State University of Iowa Human Rights Committee first annual report and correspondence, 1963

An Analysis of the Kastenmeier Omnibus Civil Rights Bill Page 1

AN ANALYSIS OF THE KASTENMEIER OMNIBUS CIVIL RIGHTS BILL (H.R. 7702) -- COMPARING IT WITH THE ADMINISTRATION BILL ( H.R. 7152)

Introduction:
     The Kastenmeier bill is the strongest civil rights legislation ever introduced. The bill combines the best features of previous bills of both parties. In addition, it contains much new material that will add significantly to the effectiveness and strength of the legislation. Necessarily the bill is lengthy: A title-by-title analysis is given below as a guide to it provisions. Comparisons are drawn, when appropriate, with the administration bill. 

TITLE I
     Section 101 (a) (2) (c) of this title moves far beyond the administration bill in securing the suffrage. Under this section any voting test or device is prohibted if it denies the right to vote on account of race or color. Further, if any test in fact falls more heavily on one class that on others, then it is presumed that the state intended it to fall more heavily, and the state must prove to the judge-- a judge appointed by the chief judge of the circuit-- that its intent was innocent. The burden is on the state to prove that it did not intend to discriminate. If, for example, a state legislature has enacted a literacy test, knowing that the education it provides Negroes is lamentalbly inferior to that it provides whites, then its intent is doubtlessly sullied.
     Thus, while particular practices are also curtailed, this general prohibition operates against any discriminatory test or device. The administration bill, by limiting itself to the regulation of existing abuses, would prompt Southern legislatures to invent fresh and unregulated discriminatory practices: for example, the good moral character test. In the Kastenmeier bill, these budding methods of suffrage limitation are, in one stroke, outlawed.
     Generally, Title I of the Kastenmeier bill accepts the legal frame of the administration voting title. But it tightens the procedure and strengthens the machinery in significant ways, as follow:
     1. All cases brought under either this title or Title III in which the Government is the plaintiff shall be tried before a judge designiated by the chief judge of the circuit. This is crucial, for unsympathetic district judges can succeed in frustrating almost any civil rights statute, no matter how tightly and forcefully drafted. The liberality of the present chief judge of the fifth circuit (6 Key Southern states) and his likely successors ensures that the intent of Congress will be faithfully executed. There is precedent for such a procedure: the chief judge of the circuit presently appoints three-judge courts to hear inj8nctive actions challenging the constitutionality of state or federal statutes.
     2. To insure the calibre of voting referees, their nomination is to be made by the chief judge of the circuit  rather than by the district-judge-dominated judicial conference, the impartiality of which in race relations would be questionable. 
     3. The guarantees of the title are broadened to civer all elections, federal or state, rather than federal elections alone.
     4. Under the administration bill the temporary voting referee Procedure can 
     5. Applications by would-be-registrants must be decided upon within 60 days, The administration bill merely refers to decisions being "expedited." Many Southern district judges have demonstrated in voting cases under the 1960 Civil Rights Act that they will not comply with exhortatory language requiring expeditious decisions. The usual process for registering to vote is a summary proceeding, normally taking minutes, even in Southern states; there is no reason why the 60-day limitation should tax any judge not intent upon obstruction. While there is only little federal statutory precedent for timing judges ian this way, several of the states, for example, New York, do place time limitations upon their courts.

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AN ANALYSIS OF THE KASTENMEIER OMNIBUS CIVIL RIGHTS BILL (H.R. 7702) -- COMPARING IT WITH THE ADMINISTRATION BILL ( H.R. 7152) Introduction: The Kastenmeier bill is the strongest civil rights legislation ever introduced. The bill combines the best features of previous bills of both parties. In addition, it contains much new material that will add significantly to the effectiveness and strength of the legislation. Necessarily the bill is lengthy: A title-by-title analysis is given below as a guide to it provisions. Comparisons are drawn, when appropriate, with the administration bill. TITLE I Section 101 (a) (2) (c) of this title moves far beyond the administration bill in securing the suffrage. Under this section any voting test or device is prohibted if it denies the right to vote on account of race or color. Further, if any test in fact falls more heavily on one class that on others, then it is presumed that the state intended it to fall more heavily, and the state must prove to the judge-- a judge appointed by the chief judge of the circuit-- that its intent was innocent. The burden is on the state to prove that it did not intend to discriminate. If, for example, a state legislature has enacted a literacy test, knowing that the education it provides Negroes is lamentalbly inferior to that it provides whites, then its intent is doubtlessly sullied. Thus, while particular practices are also curtailed, this general prohibition operates against any discriminatory test or device. The administration bill, by limiting itself to the regulation of existing abuses, would prompt Southern legislatures to invent fresh and unregulated discriminatory practices: for example, the good moral character test. In the Kastenmeier bill, these budding methods of suffrage limitation are, in one stroke, outlawed. Generally, Title I of the Kastenmeier bill accepts the legal frame of the administration voting title. But it tightens the procedure and strengthens the machinery in significant ways, as follow: 1. All cases brought under either this title or Title III in which the Government is the plaintiff shall be tried before a judge designiated by the chief judge of the circuit. This is crucial, for unsympathetic district judges can succeed in frustrating almost any civil rights statute, no matter how tightly and forcefully drafted. The liberality of the present chief judge of the fifth circuit (6 Key Southern states) and his likely successors ensures that the intent of Congress will be faithfully executed. There is precedent for such a procedure: the chief judge of the circuit presently appoints three-judge courts to hear inj8nctive actions challenging the constitutionality of state or federal statutes. 2. To insure the calibre of voting referees, their nomination is to be made by the chief judge of the circuit rather than by the district-judge-dominated judicial conference, the impartiality of which in race relations would be questionable. 3. The guarantees of the title are broadened to civer all elections, federal or state, rather than federal elections alone. 4. Under the administration bill the temporary voting referee Procedure can 5. Applications by would-be-registrants must be decided upon within 60 days, The administration bill merely refers to decisions being "expedited." Many Southern district judges have demonstrated in voting cases under the 1960 Civil Rights Act that they will not comply with exhortatory language requiring expeditious decisions. The usual process for registering to vote is a summary proceeding, normally taking minutes, even in Southern states; there is no reason why the 60-day limitation should tax any judge not intent upon obstruction. While there is only little federal statutory precedent for timing judges ian this way, several of the states, for example, New York, do place time limitations upon their courts.