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Burlington Commission on Human Rights, 1964-1965

Iowa Law Review, "State Civil Rights Statute: Some Proposals" Page 1089

1964]     STATE CIVIL RIGHTS STATUTES     1089

that the terms upon which business relations are to be conducted can be regulated in the public interest.85 Legislation of the kind under discussion would do no more than this.
   The National Labor Relations Act86 should be studied as a close analogy to the kind of laws proposed here; for it is a most satisfactory precedent in favor of the latter's constitutionality. This federal statute prohibits any employer from discriminating among his employees in regard to their hire, tenure, or other terms of employment, on the basis of their pro- or anti-union proclivities. The purpose of the law was to eradicate a form of business conduct which had a demonstrably ill effect on an interest the national government was empowered to protect. Such discrimination by employers had caused labor unrest and consequent interruptions in the flow of interstate commerce.
   Employers insisted that this federal statute was a violation of due process because it interfered with their "liberty" to do business free from arbitrary governmental restraints. Nevertheless, the act was held constitutional. It was rationally related to an end the national government had a right to achieve--the protection of interstate commerce from interruption--and the mans used were not "arbitrary in relation to the subject matter."87
   Consistent with prior discussion, much precedent directly holds that the state may proscribe racial, religious, and ethnic discrimination by employers, landlords, and various other kinds of businessmen in their commercial dealings. A long line of cases demonstrate that such statutes do not deny regulated parties their liberty or property without due process of law.
   Consider acts insuring rights of equal access for all to places of public accommodation. In holding due process no bar to such a statute, the Supreme Court of Minnesota commented that the power of the legislature to regulate "all kinds of business[es] ... conducted for the accommodation, refreshment, amusement, or instruction of the public ... so that all classes of citizens may enjoy the benefit thereof without unjust discrimination, is no longer open to discussion."88 Many other state cases have firmly concurred in this view.89 And in 1953, when the issue of the validity of the District of Columbia's public accom-
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85 See, e.g., West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934); THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 971-1036 (Corwin ed. 1953); notes 78-81 supra.
86 National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 29 U.C.C. 151-66 (1948).
87 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
88 Rhone v. Loomis, 74 Minn. 200, 204, 77 N.W. 31, 32 (1898).
89 See, e.g., Darius v. Apostolos, 68 Colo. 323, 190 Pac. 510 (1920); Baylies v. Curry, 128 Ill. 287, 21 N.E. 595 (1889); Brown v. J.H. Bell Co., 146 Iowa 89, 123

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1964] STATE CIVIL RIGHTS STATUTES 1089 that the terms upon which business relations are to be conducted can be regulated in the public interest.85 Legislation of the kind under discussion would do no more than this. The National Labor Relations Act86 should be studied as a close analogy to the kind of laws proposed here; for it is a most satisfactory precedent in favor of the latter's constitutionality. This federal statute prohibits any employer from discriminating among his employees in regard to their hire, tenure, or other terms of employment, on the basis of their pro- or anti-union proclivities. The purpose of the law was to eradicate a form of business conduct which had a demonstrably ill effect on an interest the national government was empowered to protect. Such discrimination by employers had caused labor unrest and consequent interruptions in the flow of interstate commerce. Employers insisted that this federal statute was a violation of due process because it interfered with their "liberty" to do business free from arbitrary governmental restraints. Nevertheless, the act was held constitutional. It was rationally related to an end the national government had a right to achieve--the protection of interstate commerce from interruption--and the mans used were not "arbitrary in relation to the subject matter."87 Consistent with prior discussion, much precedent directly holds that the state may proscribe racial, religious, and ethnic discrimination by employers, landlords, and various other kinds of businessmen in their commercial dealings. A long line of cases demonstrate that such statutes do not deny regulated parties their liberty or property without due process of law. Consider acts insuring rights of equal access for all to places of public accommodation. In holding due process no bar to such a statute, the Supreme Court of Minnesota commented that the power of the legislature to regulate "all kinds of business[es] ... conducted for the accommodation, refreshment, amusement, or instruction of the public ... so that all classes of citizens may enjoy the benefit thereof without unjust discrimination, is no longer open to discussion."88 Many other state cases have firmly concurred in this view.89 And in 1953, when the issue of the validity of the District of Columbia's public accom- _________________________ 85 See, e.g., West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934); THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 971-1036 (Corwin ed. 1953); notes 78-81 supra. 86 National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 29 U.C.C. 151-66 (1948). 87 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). 88 Rhone v. Loomis, 74 Minn. 200, 204, 77 N.W. 31, 32 (1898). 89 See, e.g., Darius v. Apostolos, 68 Colo. 323, 190 Pac. 510 (1920); Baylies v. Curry, 128 Ill. 287, 21 N.E. 595 (1889); Brown v. J.H. Bell Co., 146 Iowa 89, 123