DIY History | Transcribe | Campus Culture | Burlington Commission on Human Rights, 1964-1965 | Iowa Law Review, "State Civil Rights Statute: Some Proposals" Page 1092

Transcribe
Translate

Burlington Commission on Human Rights, 1964-1965

Iowa Law Review, "State Civil Rights Statute: Some Proposals" Page 1092

1092     IOWA LAW REVIEW    [Vol. 49
   Prior discussion should make it readily apparent that legislation barring employers, landlords, and various other businessmen from discriminating in their commercial affairs on account of race, religion, or ethnic background, does not deny them either liberty or property without due process of law. However, one further point should be emphasized in respect to the due-process arguments advanced by opponents of such legislation. It is true that antidiscrimination statutes also collide to some extent with the individual's freedom to choose those with whom he will associate. But this lends no greater constitutional immunity to such discriminatory business conduct than that indicated previously. All sorts of legislation that prohibit or mandate conduct in the public interest in some measure limit the individual's ability to choose those with whom he will associate.
   The constitution itself prevents us from selecting our associates in employment, housing, or public accommodations on the basis of race, religion, or ethnic background when any of our local, state, or national governments is the employer, landlord, or proprietor.98 Furthermore, the government may not even lend its assistance to the enforcement of purely private discriminatory agreements, despite the fact that they may have been entered into in order to insulate oneself from "unwelcome" minorities.99 Past these relatively minor encroachments on the individual's freedom to choose those with whom he desires to associate, are federal, state, and local laws which compel us in many circumstances to put up with unwelcome individuals. Consider the military draft laws, compulsory school laws, and laws prohibiting discrimination in various kinds of business dealings on the basis of union proclivities, age, sex, military status, and the like.100 These and many other kinds
_________________________
constitutional system is adequate for the protection of the civil rights of its citizens against discrimination by reason of race or color."
98 See note 46 supra. See also Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526 (1963) (municipal parks and recreational facilities); New Orleans Park Improvement Ass'n v. Detiege, 252 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1958) (public parks); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 223 F.2d 93 (5th Cir. 1955) (public parks and golf courses); Dawson v. Mayor and City Council, 220 F.2d 386 (4th Cir. 1955) (public beaches); 2 EMERSON & HABER, POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 1242 (2d ed. 1958). Note also IOWA CODE 735.3-.4 (1962). These provisions penalize any person hiring employees for public institutions in this state for discriminating in such hiring on the basis of the job applicant's religion.
99 Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
100 See, e.g., National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. 151-66 (unlawful for employer to discriminate in hire or tenure on basis of individual's anti- or pro-union proclivities); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN 69-7-5(1)(b) (Supp. 1960) (unlawful to discriminate on basis of sex in rental of housing); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 354:3 (1955) (unlawful for proprietor of public

Saving...

1092 IOWA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49 Prior discussion should make it readily apparent that legislation barring employers, landlords, and various other businessmen from discriminating in their commercial affairs on account of race, religion, or ethnic background, does not deny them either liberty or property without due process of law. However, one further point should be emphasized in respect to the due-process arguments advanced by opponents of such legislation. It is true that antidiscrimination statutes also collide to some extent with the individual's freedom to choose those with whom he will associate. But this lends no greater constitutional immunity to such discriminatory business conduct than that indicated previously. All sorts of legislation that prohibit or mandate conduct in the public interest in some measure limit the individual's ability to choose those with whom he will associate. The constitution itself prevents us from selecting our associates in employment, housing, or public accommodations on the basis of race, religion, or ethnic background when any of our local, state, or national governments is the employer, landlord, or proprietor.98 Furthermore, the government may not even lend its assistance to the enforcement of purely private discriminatory agreements, despite the fact that they may have been entered into in order to insulate oneself from "unwelcome" minorities.99 Past these relatively minor encroachments on the individual's freedom to choose those with whom he desires to associate, are federal, state, and local laws which compel us in many circumstances to put up with unwelcome individuals. Consider the military draft laws, compulsory school laws, and laws prohibiting discrimination in various kinds of business dealings on the basis of union proclivities, age, sex, military status, and the like.100 These and many other kinds _________________________ constitutional system is adequate for the protection of the civil rights of its citizens against discrimination by reason of race or color." 98 See note 46 supra. See also Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526 (1963) (municipal parks and recreational facilities); New Orleans Park Improvement Ass'n v. Detiege, 252 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1958) (public parks); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 223 F.2d 93 (5th Cir. 1955) (public parks and golf courses); Dawson v. Mayor and City Council, 220 F.2d 386 (4th Cir. 1955) (public beaches); 2 EMERSON & HABER, POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 1242 (2d ed. 1958). Note also IOWA CODE 735.3-.4 (1962). These provisions penalize any person hiring employees for public institutions in this state for discriminating in such hiring on the basis of the job applicant's religion. 99 Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 100 See, e.g., National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. 151-66 (unlawful for employer to discriminate in hire or tenure on basis of individual's anti- or pro-union proclivities); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN 69-7-5(1)(b) (Supp. 1960) (unlawful to discriminate on basis of sex in rental of housing); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 354:3 (1955) (unlawful for proprietor of public