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Burlington Commission on Human Rights, 1964-1965

Iowa Law Review, "State Civil Rights Statute: Some Proposals" Page 1127

1964]     STATE CIVIL RIGHTS STATUTES     1127

tirely occupied" by the state.199 However, this state's public accommodations statute is not so all embracive as its employment act. The piecemeal approach used in the public accommodations statute specifically enumerates the particular establishments covered. It therefore may not be "so comprehensive as to entirely occupy the field of its subject."200 An argument can be made that local legislation supplementing the coverage of that statute, and in no way inconsistent with its terms, should be a valid exercise of local powers.201 If the legislature objects, it should clearly say so, and of course our cities and towns will be bound.
   As far as housing is concerned, the legislature has been completely silent. It has spoken about transient housing in the public accommodations act; but with respect to the legislative handling of discrimination such housing has historically and universally been considered a separate field from nontransient housing.202 The General Assembly's complete silence on the matter should therefore leave this field open for action by our cities and towns. This is especially so because local ordinances barring discrimination in housing would supplement the general state policy of equal opportunity declared int he present employment and public accommodations acts, and would in now way obstruct or interfere with any discernible state policy. As a result, if discrimination in housing can be deemed a "strictly local and internal affair" of our cities and towns, they can deal with it. For unlike
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199 There might be some room, however, for an argument to the effect that the remedy provided int he state act was not meant to be exclusive. Note that a cause of action for damages while not provided for in the act can probably be predicated on it. See Humburd v. Crawford, 128 Iowa 743, 105 N.W. 330 (1905). If the state act has not occupied the field as far as the remedy is concerned, Iowa cities should be free to supplement it with the kind of administrative remedy discussed in this Article. The argument in this footnote applies as well to the public accommodations statute.
200 Note that barbershops are covered by the public accommodations act, but beauty shops are not. See note 126 supra.
201 In City of Des Moines v. Reiter, 251 Iowa 1206, 1209, 102 N.W.2d 363, 365-66 (1960), the court, quoting from Gannett v. Cook, 245 Iowa 750, 755, 61 N.W.2d 703, 706-07 (1954), stated:
   [A] municipal regulation which is merely additional to that of the state law does not create a conflict therewith. Where the legislature has assumed to regulate a given course of conduct by prohibitionary enactments, a municipal corporation may make such additional reasonable regulations in aid and furtherance of the purpose of the general law as may seem appropriate to the necessities of the particular locality. The fact that an ordinance enlarges on the provisions of a statute by requiring more than the statute requires creates no conflict therewith unless the statute limits the requirements for all cases to its own prescriptions.
See City of Des Moines v. Rosenburt, 243 Iowa 262, 51 N.W.wd 450 (1952); Pugh v. City of Des Moines, 176 Iowa 593, 157 N.W. 892 (1916).
202 See KONVITZ & LESKES, op. cit. supra note 196, at 155-93, 236-51.

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1964] STATE CIVIL RIGHTS STATUTES 1127 tirely occupied" by the state.199 However, this state's public accommodations statute is not so all embracive as its employment act. The piecemeal approach used in the public accommodations statute specifically enumerates the particular establishments covered. It therefore may not be "so comprehensive as to entirely occupy the field of its subject."200 An argument can be made that local legislation supplementing the coverage of that statute, and in no way inconsistent with its terms, should be a valid exercise of local powers.201 If the legislature objects, it should clearly say so, and of course our cities and towns will be bound. As far as housing is concerned, the legislature has been completely silent. It has spoken about transient housing in the public accommodations act; but with respect to the legislative handling of discrimination such housing has historically and universally been considered a separate field from nontransient housing.202 The General Assembly's complete silence on the matter should therefore leave this field open for action by our cities and towns. This is especially so because local ordinances barring discrimination in housing would supplement the general state policy of equal opportunity declared int he present employment and public accommodations acts, and would in now way obstruct or interfere with any discernible state policy. As a result, if discrimination in housing can be deemed a "strictly local and internal affair" of our cities and towns, they can deal with it. For unlike ________________________ 199 There might be some room, however, for an argument to the effect that the remedy provided int he state act was not meant to be exclusive. Note that a cause of action for damages while not provided for in the act can probably be predicated on it. See Humburd v. Crawford, 128 Iowa 743, 105 N.W. 330 (1905). If the state act has not occupied the field as far as the remedy is concerned, Iowa cities should be free to supplement it with the kind of administrative remedy discussed in this Article. The argument in this footnote applies as well to the public accommodations statute. 200 Note that barbershops are covered by the public accommodations act, but beauty shops are not. See note 126 supra. 201 In City of Des Moines v. Reiter, 251 Iowa 1206, 1209, 102 N.W.2d 363, 365-66 (1960), the court, quoting from Gannett v. Cook, 245 Iowa 750, 755, 61 N.W.2d 703, 706-07 (1954), stated: [A] municipal regulation which is merely additional to that of the state law does not create a conflict therewith. Where the legislature has assumed to regulate a given course of conduct by prohibitionary enactments, a municipal corporation may make such additional reasonable regulations in aid and furtherance of the purpose of the general law as may seem appropriate to the necessities of the particular locality. The fact that an ordinance enlarges on the provisions of a statute by requiring more than the statute requires creates no conflict therewith unless the statute limits the requirements for all cases to its own prescriptions. See City of Des Moines v. Rosenburt, 243 Iowa 262, 51 N.W.wd 450 (1952); Pugh v. City of Des Moines, 176 Iowa 593, 157 N.W. 892 (1916). 202 See KONVITZ & LESKES, op. cit. supra note 196, at 155-93, 236-51.